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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the representations of interspecies relationships in
contemporary American literature. In recent years, interdisciplinary attention,
variously referred to under the umbrella categories of “Posthumanism,” “HumanAnimal Studies,” “Animality Studies,” and “Critical Animal Studies,” have called into
question the anthropocentric traditions across multiple disciplines. However, much
of this recent attention still focuses on animals in the abstract, which is to say that
they rarely concern themselves with actual animals or our relationships to them.
Even when a real animal manages to penetrate a text, such as Jacques Derrida’s cat
in the opening pages of The Animal That Therefore I Am, that animal quickly vanishes
amid the anthropocentric concerns of the author. Through the close reading of
various contemporary America texts, fiction and non-fiction, this dissertation focuses
on the representation of interspecies interactions in these texts as a way to
understand and interrogate the affective possibilities that they present in quotidian
life.
This dissertation begins by looking at John Steinbeck’s work and his consistent
interests in other species which culminates in one of his final books, Travels with
Charley: In Search of America. Steinbeck offers an interesting new ethic in Travels
with Charley that asserts that the solidarity between all species arises from all life’s
singular duty to persist—to go on. From here, Toni Morrison’s Beloved and The Bluest
Eye are taken up as polemics against the biopolitical regimes of biologism and liberal
humanism. Through Morrison’s work it is evident that it is not simply a failure of

ethics that lead to the slave trade, but rather, it was the insidiousness of these two
ideologies that created the possibilities for slavery. While Slavery has ceased to exist
in America, the ideologies that made it possible persist. The final chapter considers
the logical conclusion of liberal humanism by looking at post-apocalyptic narratives:
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, Paolo Bacigalupi’s “The People of Sand and Slag,”
Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, and Harlan Ellison’s “A Boy and
his Dog.” This dissertation concludes with an exploration of the anime film, Ghost in
the Shell, as a possible exit point from the contemporary ideologies of biologism and
liberal humanism. In the face of ever advancing technology, Ghost in the Shell
suggests that the end of liberal humanism will not be an apocalypse, but rather a
gradual erasure as humanity is forced to consider life beyond organic species.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Examining Quotidian Life with the Rise of Animal Studies

In recent years, interdisciplinary attention, variously referred to under the
umbrella categories of “Posthumanism,” “Human-Animal Studies,” “Animality
Studies,” and “Critical Animal Studies,” have called into question the anthropocentric
traditions across multiple disciplines. However, much of this recent attention still
focuses on animals in the abstract, which is to say that they rarely concern
themselves with actual animals or our relationships to them. Even when a real animal
manages to penetrate a text, such as Jacques Derrida’s cat in the opening pages of
The Animal That Therefore I Am, that animal quickly vanishes amid the
anthropocentric concerns of the author. Through the close reading of various
contemporary America texts, fiction and non-fiction, this dissertation focuses on the
representation of interspecies interactions in these texts as a way to understand and
interrogate the affective possibilities that they present for future quotidian life.
Jacques Derrida, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth
century, claims that the question of the animal has always motivated his writings,
although it was not until the end of his career that he focused on the question in
extended detail in The Animal That Therefore I Am, and his lectures collected in The
Beast and the Sovereign. Derrida states in The Animal That Therefore I Am that
“since I began writing, in fact, I believe I have dedicated [his work] to the question of
1

the living and of the living animal. For me that will always have been the most
important and decisive question. I have addressed it a thousand times, either
directly or obliquely, by means of readings of all the philosophers I have taken an
interest in…” (34). In many ways, Derrida’s admission that all his work is “dedicated
to the question of the living and of the living animal” appears to hold true for a large
number of philosophers. After all, the human, the foremost concern of philosophy,
has often been defined by that which it is not; in other words, the human comes into
existence because of the animal other that it can be defined against. This holds true
for everyone from Rene Descartes’s animals as machines to Martin Heidegger’s
animals as poor in the world and continues with contemporary philosophers like
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of “becoming animal.” Clearly, the
question of the animal, which in turn, is also the question of the human, remains a
central and pressing concern for philosophy.
In addition to the question of the animal being a philosophical concern, with
the publication of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, and the rise of powerful
organizations like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals and the Sea Shepard
Society (with their popular television show, Whale Wars), it has increasingly become
a cultural concern as well, as animal rights and animal welfare movements become
mainstream. Interestingly, however, is that at the same moment that the question of
the animal expands beyond the mere concern of philosophers and into the realm of
popular culture, the vast majority of Americans are increasingly distanced from
actual animal life. As more of the population is concentrated into urban areas,
2

combined with the expulsion of animal life through habitat loss and the rise of
factory farms, encounters with animal life often only happens through the mediated
experiences of literature, film, and the internet. Because of this, critical attention
must be focused on these mediated encounters in order to understand our
relationship with animals—and by extension, to understand our understanding of
ourselves.
While the importance of careful attention to the representation of species in
literature, art, and film is of obvious necessity, non-human life has often been
relegated to the metaphoric and symbolic. That is to say that the animals (and
occasionally plants) have been seen as literary devices simply there for the author to
use to illuminate something about the human characters. Without a doubt, it is true
that the inclusion of non-human life does reveal something the human characters;
however, animals should not be dismissed as if that is their only function. The
inclusion of animal life also interrogates, illuminates, and constructs interspecies
relationships inside and outside of the texts. In addition, drawing from Derrida’s
displeasure at the philosophical tendency to reduce the multiplicity of all animal life
to the singular “animal,” it is equally important to recognize that the animals in these
texts are not infinitely substitutable, they are autonomous and individual. John
Steinbeck’s poodle, Charley, in Travels With Charley, is not substitutable with Bob,
the dog in Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye; the fact that they are of the same species
does not eliminate their ontological specificity.
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Mary Allen’s important 1983 book, Animals in American Literature, does a
great deal to address the flawed approaches to understanding animals in literature;
however, she too does not account for how these representations of animals and
interspecies relationships extend beyond the text. Instead, she chooses to only look
at how animals are represented across a particular author’s oeuvre without
extending her analysis beyond the text. Therefore, the animals, while free from their
allegorical shackles, remain the objects of humans. In recent years, scholars such as
Carrie Rohman in Stalking the Subject: Modernism and the Animal, Sherryl Vint in
Animal Alterity: Science Fiction and the Question of the Animal, and even Cary Wolfe
in Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory,
have begun to examine what the textual representations of interspecies relationships
mean beyond the text. As commendable as the work being done in texts such as
these is, they too are often more concerned with the abstract or anthropocentric
than they are with quotidian life. In contrast, this work is explicitly concerned with
how these representations of animal life and interspecies interaction reflects and
affects quotidian life. It is the relationship between the multitudes of life, animal and
human, with which this dissertation is concerned.
Cary Wolfe, in his reading of moral philosopher Cora Diamond’s work in his
essay “Flesh and Finitude: Thinking Animals in (Post)Humanist Philosophy,” describes
her view of “the force of literature” as being “its difference from philosophy, its
ability to confront propositional, analytic thought with its own limitations,” and not
simply a sentimental supplement (which Wolfe suggests Martha Nussbaum, among
4

others, believes) to philosophy. This dissertation takes up Diamond’s view on
literature, as something more than a supplement to philosophy, while also insisting
that literature is a uniquely productive force capable not only of being reflective, but
also affective. Following this line of thought, this work exclusively examines the
literary representations of animals and interspecies interactions in contemporary
American Literature in terms of their affective possibilities for quotidian life.
It is foremost important to understand that the rise of “Critical Animal
Studies” comes in the epoch of Posthumanism. This context is important when we
consider Michael Lundblad’s insistence in his essay “From Animal to Animality
Studies” that “’animality studies” must be seen as a field that “expresses no explicit
interest in advocacy for various nonhuman animals” (497). Lundblad’s need to
explicitly state that his work (animality studies) does not have an interest in advocacy
for nonhuman animals—and can, as he proudly states, “be seen as speciesist”—is
necessary to avoid “the risk of ahistorical, universalist prescriptions about how to
treat or interact with non-human animal” (500). Leaving aside the fact that no serious
scholar exploring human-animal relationships—from Singer to Haraway—offers
“ahistorical, universalist prescriptions” beyond recognizing that animals can suffer1, it
is important to understand that Lundblad so needs to make this distinction because
he does not want to be taken as sentimental, in other words, as not being serious.
Lundblad is not alone either, even among Animal Studies scholars that do take into

1

This is generally in response to Jeremy Bentham’s reformulation of how we think about animals in An
Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislation. Bentham states that “the question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”
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account animal welfare in their work, there is the need to disguise any empathy or
advocacy lest they be taken as not serious scholars. For example, Cary Wolfe is
undoubtedly one of the biggest names in Animal Studies, yet in his book Animal
Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of the Species, and Posthumanist Theory, he is
careful to remind the reader that his work (or field) “has nothing to do with whether
you like animals” (7). Of course, no such disclaimer need be asserted by those that
dislike animals, they are still seen as being able to do serious work. To illustrate this
point one only need to look at the much celebrated work about “becoming-animal”
by French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book A Thousand
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Deleuze and Guattari explicitly state that
“anyone who likes cats or dogs is a fool” (240, emphasis in the original). They display
great scorn for “individuated animals, family pets, sentimental, Oedipal animals each
with its own petty history…[which] invite us to regress, draw us into narcissistic
contemplation” (240). Instead, they favor, to quote Donna Haraway, “sublime wolf
packs,” where “we will learn nothing about actual wolves” (When Species Meet, 29).
In spite of this hatred for the ordinary individual animal—the animals that we are
most in contact with—Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-animal” (not actual animal
mind you, imaginary metaphoric animal) is ubiquitous in Animal Studies. Haraway
continues her critique of their work: “I am not sure I can find in philosophy a clearer
display of misogyny, fear of aging, incuriosity about animals, and horror at the
ordinariness of flesh, here covered by the alibi of an anti-Oedipal and anticapitalist
project” [emphasis added] (30). With this in mind, Critical Animal Studies, of which
6

this dissertation is a part, insists that one cannot take the question of animals
seriously without first taking animals seriously. This means that animals, real animals
(i.e. not fictitious “sublime wolf packs”), must be approached openly and honestly
which, in and of itself, is advocacy for animals. In addition, because Critical Animal
Studies is a Posthumanist field, it seeks to break free of legacy of Cartesian liberal
humanism which insists on a single and indivisible line of demarcation between
human and animal—a binary opposition—and therefore, explicitly or implicitly
advocates for nonhuman animals (and, I would argue, for human animals as well) 2. In
addition, as will be demonstrated later, I also propose that Critical Animal Studies
(and Posthumanism in general) challenges liberal humanism’s binary opposition—the
other extreme—biological continuism (biologism). All this is to say that the work that
Critical Animal Studies does, the work that Lundblad wants to be sure he is not
accused of doing, the work that Wolfe and others take caution to obfuscate,
inherently—whether explicitly or implicitly—advocates for the welfare of human and
non-human animals alike3.
The fear of being seen as not “being serious” is not the only anxiety that
Critical Animal Studies scholars experience. There are also the difficulties of
terminology and the fear of anthropomorphizing. I would first like to confront the
2

Liberal Humanism is used as a term to denote the post-theological worldview that posits Man, not
God, is the center and source of knowing in the world. It is also used to denote a Post-Cartesian
world—where Man is not only the center of the world, but the only knowing being, all other animals
are simply machines.
3
The Institute for Critical Animals Studies, the leading international academic organization for the
field, defines CAS on their website as follows: “Rooted in animal liberation, CAS is an interdisciplinary
radical scholarly field dedicated to establishing a holistic total liberation movement for humans,
nonhuman animals, and the Earth. CAS is engaged in an intersectional, theory-to-action politics, in
solidarity with movements to abolish all systems of domination and oppression.”
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problem of terminology, which is to say, what is it that we mean when we say
“animal” and “human?” Can we have honest conversations when the entirety of nonhuman life is lumped into a single category? As Derrida famously remarked in The
Animal that Therefore I Am:
Animal is a word that men have given themselves the right to give.
These humans are found giving it to themselves, this word, but as if
they had received it as an inheritance. They have given themselves the
word in order to corral a large number of living beings within a single
concept: “The Animal,” they say. And they have given it to themselves,
this word, at the same time according themselves, reserving for them,
for humans, the right to the word, the naming noun [nom], the verb,
the attribute, to a language of words, in short to the very thing that
the others in question would be deprived of, those that are corralled
within the grand territory of the beasts: The Animal. (32)
Derrida’s solution is to invent the neologism animot to reflect the multiplicity of
nonhuman animal life. Others, such as Cognitive Ethologist Marc Bekoff, attempt to
erase the indivisible line created by the categorization of “human” and “animal” by
including humans in the category of animal—using the terms nonhuman animal and
human animal (although the “animal” in human animal is often only implied).
However, both of these solutions are problematic. Derrida’s neologism, though
recognizing the multiplicity of animal life, is still “a word that men [man, in this case]
have given themselves the right to give,” and does acknowledge specificity or the
8

possibility of vast chasms between species (not just between human and animal, but
between animal and animal as well). On the other hand, Bekoff and the others that
choose to use “nonhuman animal” and the implied “human animal” too closely
approaches biologism—where the distinction between species is effaced. Because of
these difficulties, I have chosen to use “animal” and “human” throughout this work
with the realization that they are problematic terms. However, as I am committed to
acknowledging ontological specificity, whenever possible I avoid the generalized
category of “animal” in favor of the particular species or individual name. This of
course does not alleviate the problem of terminology, but I am not convinced that
there is a solution. In any event, if a solution is crafted, I question whether that
solution will provide any greater benefit for animals than what simply being aware of
the problem of terminology does.
The final anxiety, of being anthropomorphic, has been sufficiently addressed
by Marc Bekoff. Although Bekoff, as a scientist, experiences a slightly different
anxiety around anthropomorphism, his suggestion that we can be “carefully
anthropomorphic” is applicable across disciplines (Minding Animals, 49). Bekoff
argues: “Being anthropomorphic does not ignore the animals’ perspectives. Rather,
anthropomorphism can help make accessible to us the behavior and thoughts and
feelings of the animals with whom we are sharing a particular experience” (50). This
commitment to “careful anthropomorphism” is one that I share with Bekoff.
Although the risk of speaking in place of the animal is always there, “careful
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anthropomorphism” offers the best possibility to render contact zones between our
species and others intelligible.
The next chapter, “Poodles Maketh the Man: The Conspiracy of Life and
Microbial Ethics in John Steinbeck’s Sea of Cortez and Travels with Charley” explores
how the representation of animal life in these two non-fiction works reflects and
challenges Cary Wolfe’s work and offers a way to view species relations beyond
finitude. In addition, Travels With Charley anticipates many of the concerns that arise
in the subsequent chapters on Toni Morrison’s works and Post-Apocalyptic
narratives.
This chapter begins by looking at Mary Allen’s chapter on Steinbeck in her
book, Animals in American Literature, in which she states that “by one means or
another, John Steinbeck’s animals are put to death.” She continues, suggesting that
“the tenderness expressed for human suffering [in Steinbeck’s work] does not extend
to animals—nor does Steinbeck’s sentimentality—as he maintains an almost perfect
detachment from their sensations” (115). Allen supports her argument by analyzing
the depiction of animals across most of Steinbeck’s works and ultimately concludes
that “throughout [Steinbeck’s work] animals exist to be used by man” (116).
Curiously, however, she excludes Travels With Charley, one of Steinbeck’s final
works, in her analysis.
Outside of Allen’s essay, Steinbeck’s attention to animals is widely chronicled.
Central to most discussions of animals in Steinbeck is his work with Ed Ricketts and
the resulting book Sea of Cortez. According to the noted Steinbeck scholar James C.
10

Kelley, part of Steinbeck’s enduring popularity can be attributed to his “nonteleological thinking” and method of scientific observation that he develops in Sea of
Cortez (255). Although, as Kelley points out, Steinbeck’s attention to animals was not
always well received as critics often “complained that he was obsessed with animals
and reduced humans to the level of animals, stripping them of all the noble qualities
of humanity as we know it” (256). Kelley argues that as philosophy moved away from
the theological and towards the scientific in the latter half of the twentieth century,
Steinbeck’s treatment of humans and animals as part of a biological continuum
becomes more accepted. In many ways Steinbeck’s treatment of animals aligns with
his treatment of other marginalized groups and further solidifies his role as champion
of the disempowered. However, it is a disservice to simplify Steinbeck’s concern with
animals to a sentimental affinity with the downtrodden. Instead, Steinbeck is slowly
developing a theory of the unity of life that, unlike Derrida and Wolfe, does not
depend on finitude and embodiment.
This chapter then examines The Log from the Sea of Cortez, where Steinbeck
begins to first develop his philosophy of life while observing the tide pools and
remarks in the oft-quoted passage:
Our own interest lay in relationships of animal to animal. If one
observes in this relational sense, it seems apparent that species are
only commas in a sentence, that each species is at once the point and
the base of a pyramid, that all life is relational to the point that where
an Einsteinian relativity seems to emerge. And not only the meaning
11

but the feeling about species grows misty…the knowledge that all
things are one thing and that one thing is all things—plankton, a
shimmering phosphorescence on the sea and the spinning planets and
an expanding universe, all bound together by the elastic string of time.
It is advisable to look from the tide pool to the stars and then back to
the tide pool again. (178-179)
From this passage, it is clear to see that the boundary between species is in no way
absolute, and may, in fact, be completely imaginary. It is also in the Sea of Cortez that
Steinbeck begins to think about life and what he called “non-life,” ultimately
concluding that the dividing line here is also porous. For Kelley, and many other
critics, this is where Steinbeck’s biological continuism is most readily evident.
This chapter will then move towards Derrida’s observation that biological
continuism—biologism in his terminology—is not something to be celebrated. As
Derrida scholar Leonard Lawlor explains in This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on
Animality and Human Nature in Derrida: “This risk of biologism is really the risk of a
direct attack on the difference between animals and humans. If one raises animals to
the level of humans, or if one lowers humans to the level of animals, one ignores the
difference that requires living beings to be treated in a variety of ways.” Because of
the implicit implications of biologism, Steinbeck is rightfully criticized for the Sea of
Cortez. However, the criticism can only hold up if his later works, particularly Travels
with Charley, are completely ignored. Travels with Charley, written twenty years after

12

Sea of Cortez, expands and refines his earlier observations—and like Derrida,
provides a solution to the problem of biologism.
This chapter moves towards comparing the solutions offered by Derrida—and
refined by Wolfe—and Steinbeck to the problem of biologism. For Derrida, the
solution to the risk of biologism when posing the question of species is based on
recognizing, as Cary Wolfe explains, “that the fundamental ethical bond we have with
nonhuman animals resides in our shared finitude, our vulnerability and mortality as
‘fellow creatures’” (Posthumanism, 80). In Travels with Charley, while explicitly
stating that “one kind of life became different than all others,” Steinbeck also
presents a counter vision to Derrida’s shared finitude. Unlike Derrida—where ethical
obligation resides in the possibility of death—Steinbeck suggests that it resides in
“one ingredient, perhaps the most important of all, is planted in every life form—the
factor of survival” (217). Therefore, rather than our ethical bond being based on our
eventual death, Steinbeck locates it in our persistence to survive. This radical
reconfiguration directly challenges the understanding of interspecies obligations (and
relationships) that Cary Wolfe and others have offered. How then do ethics as a
practice of life—of survival and persistence—rather than ethics as the possibility of
death, reconfigure our relationship with the non-human other?
The next chapter, “The Practice of Becoming-Human: Interspecies
Interactions in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and The Bluest Eye,” will continue
interrogating the themes of the previous chapter and explore how species, race, and
alterity intersect in Morrison’s work to provide an understanding of the obligation
13

and the possibilities of (interspecies) companionship. In addition, I argue in this
chapter that Morrison’s work also interrogates the insidious implications of biologism
and liberal humanism.
This chapter begins by pointing out that animals are a consistent feature of
Morrison’s work—from Bob the dog in The Bluest Eye to Sorrow's mystical mermaids
and whales in A Mercy, Morrison scatters animals and animal imagery throughout
her work. The scholars that have examined this aspect of Morrison’s work, such as
Tuire Valkeakari and Vera Norwood, have approached it from an anthropocentric
perspective, meaning that they explore how animals are used to demonstrate the
way African Americans are dehumanized in order to justify their oppression. The
other common critical approach, found in the work of Greta Gaard and others, is to
insist that the animals are either allegorical or mere plot devices. In both these cases,
the animals become nothing more than narrative tools to illustrate the problems of
the human characters. Unfortunately, these approaches are largely trapped in the
traditions of liberal humanist discourse and therefore, insufficiently address the
significance of the actual animals in Morrison’s work. As the speciesist logic of liberal
humanism continues to be discredited in science as well as philosophy, it would seem
appropriate to approach the animals in Morrison’s work from a non-anthropocentric
framework—a framework that suggests Morrison's project is not only to re-write the
history of African-Americans, but to also re-imagine the role of animals in our society
and the relationships between species, or perhaps, to even re-imagine the notion of
species itself.
14

This chapter goes on to examine Beloved, which is undoubtedly Morrison’s
most well-known work, and it is also one of her most complex. Ostensibly it is the
story of Sethe and her children’s escape from slavery in the South and the aftermath
of the atrocity that Sethe commits when the plantation overseer tracks her down in
the North. However, the complexity of the novel arises because it is not simply an
indictment of the institution of slavery; instead it is a thorough attack on the forces
that create the conditions that allow for such an institution to exist—namely, liberal
humanism and biologism.
Beloved is a text that is saturated with an implicit commitment to biologism—
that is to say a commitment to a biological continuum. Biologism insists that species
is an unbreakable chain that can be arranged into a hierarchy. It would be easy to
mistake the dehumanization of African Americans in the novel as being evidence that
there is an absolute rupture between Man and Animal with the slave being placed in
the Animal side of the binary. However, the text constantly allows the position of
species to fluctuate, which suggests that there is no absolute division, but rather a
hierarchal continuum that allows for species to be ranked as well as rank variations
within species. Biologism also lends itself to the establishment of a biopolitical
regime—and this chapter goes on to explore how Morrison seeks a way to resist that
regime through Sethe’s unspeakable action. Sethe’s action can only be understood
through the lens of Giorgio Agamben’s work on the Sovereign and the state of
exception which demonstrates that there is no outside of the biopolitical regime and
Law. Therefore, Sethe’s only possible way to resist is through what Slavoj Zizek calls
15

an “impossible act” (“From Politics to Biopolitics, 511). Here the only possible way to
escape the biopolitical regime is by an action that the current configuration cannot
possibly understand, an impossible act that therefore, creates anomie. It is the
unaccounted for and unaccountable that disrupts the biopolitical machine—that
creates a momentary stutter and allows for a truly anomic space. The law of the
biopolitical regime does not know what to do in the face of the impossible.
Ultimately, Sethe’s transgression displays the law’s true impotence in a biopolitical
regime.
From here, this chapter moves to focus on Morrison’s first novel, The Bluest
Eye, and the development of the protagonist, Pecola Breedlove. Pecola’s
development is intricately bound to the appearance of two animals in the novel—an
unnamed cat and Bob the dog. Both animals ultimately end up dead and Pecola is
ultimately implicated in both deaths. The deaths of the animals completely eliminate
the possibility for Pecola to develop into a healthy adult and represent a larger
structural flaw with ideological apparatus of humanism and biopolitical power.
Contrary to Sethe’s “impossible act,” The Bluest Eye suggests that encounters with
what Donna Haraway calls “significant otherness, “may also open a space to resist
the biopolitical regime.
The final chapter, “A Boy and His Dog and A Man and His Sheep: Imagining
Animal Companions After the End of the World,” examines the significance of
animals in post-apocalyptic literature. This chapter originates from noticing a curious
addition in the film adaptation of Cormac McCarthy’s post-apocalyptic novel The
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Road. At the end of the novel, the unnamed boy’s father has died and his only chance
at survival is joining a ragged looking man and woman that have been following him
and his father. Although the man insists that he is a good guy and will take care of the
boy, the reader is left with only ambiguity—there is no evidence that the boy will be
safe with the man and the woman. At the end of John Hillcoat’s film adaptation
however, the ambiguity is removed by the inclusion of a healthy looking dog joining
the man and the woman (as well as two kids). The inclusion of the dog indicates to
the reader that everything will be okay, after all, at a time when many are turning to
cannibalism to stave off starvation, then a person that takes care of and feeds a dog
will certainly take care of and feed the boy. The dog then, through its inclusion in the
film and exclusion in the novel provides a significant addition to understanding the
narrative. The Road is not alone with its consideration of animals after the
apocalypse as animal (most commonly dogs) consistently appear.4 Nearly every wellknown post-apocalyptic narrative over the last five decades has given some
importance to the role of animals after the apocalypse—from classics like Mad Max
and Terminator to more recent works like Children of Men to the popular video game
series Fallout—animals are integral to the dystopic narrative worlds.
A closer inspection reveals that many narratives are split between competing
visions of what comes after the end of the world; on the one side is the even
encroaching liberal humanist future and on the other side is the imagined
4

Although it could be argued that the novel The Road does not ascribe any significance to animals in
the narrative, I will contend that their lack of prominence in the narrative is also significant as their
absence cannot—or at least should not—go unnoticed.
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possibilities of a Posthumanist future.5 This chapter focuses on four specific texts
(plus the film adaptation of The Road) to understand how these competing visions
are articulated and what their implications are. These texts are Cormac McCarthy’s
novel The Road; Paolo Bacigalupi’s novelette, “The People of Sand and Slag;” Harlan
Ellison’s classic story “A Boy and His Dog;” and finally, Philip K. Dick’s well-known
novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?.
This chapter begins by examining McCarthy’s novel and why it matters that
unlike the film adaptation, the dog is effectively erased. Though both works are
insistently extensions of the liberal humanist project, the film’s inclusion of the dog
at the end undercuts the vision of the end—the end of liberal humanism—that
McCarthy’s novel so masterfully articulates. As scholar Hannah Stark explains: “The
Road offers an anthropocentric vision of the end of the world in which humans are
the final witnesses, and also in which the human is also the end of the world” (80).
McCarthy’s novel succeeds where the film does not because of his willingness to
follow liberal humanism to its logical conclusion. The true apocalypse is not when
humans cease to exist, nor is it when Steinbeck’s figure of “unlife” finally triumphs
over all life, it is when all that Man has given himself dominion over (all other life)
ceases to exist and therefore, Man loses all significance.
Bacigalupi’s “The People of Sand and Slag,” also pushes liberal humanism to
its logical conclusion. Unlike McCarthy’s vision however, Bacigalupi’s vision imagines
5

There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization about post-apocalyptic narratives and this
insight is based on primarily American works (with some British) that are also well-known, at least
within the genre.
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a world where technological advances can stave off the diminishing significance of
the human. These technological advances free liberal humanism from what Jacques
Derrida argues has always bound the human to all other life—shared finitude
(vulnerability). With that tie severed, the apotheosis of the figure of the human
completes the liberal humanist project.6 However, as the Bacigalupi story illustrates,
the completion of the liberal humanist project does not result in a some utopia—it is
just as, if not more, dystopic and pessimistic as McCarthy’s novel. Whereas The Road
imagines the apocalypse as the diminishing significance of the human, “The People of
Sand and Slag” imagines the apocalypse as the end of affect.
From here, this chapter examines two narratives that offer alternatives to the
inevitable bleak anthropocentric dystopias of liberal humanism. The first is Philip K.
Dick’s classic novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? which oddly enough opens
with the obituary of a real life tortoise, Tu’i Malila. This opening highlights the
importance of animals in the narrative. Although a good deal of scholarly attention
has been given to the conflict between human and android in the novel, the
importance of animals in the narrative has rarely been sufficiently explored. The
central motivation for Deckard is not to “retire” (kill) the androids in the novel, in
fact, part of his personal crisis is a result of the apathy he feels towards his
profession, but rather, his motivation is to obtain enough money to purchase a “real”
animal (14). Unfortunately, for Deckard, the only way to obtain the money to
6

It is interesting that Bacigalupi imagines that the culmination of the liberal humanist project as a
merging of the human with machine when it is Descartes rendering of animals as machines that begins
the liberal humanist project.
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purchase one of the rare “real” animals that exist post-apocalypse is to collect the
bounty on the androids. Deckard’s constantly referenced obsession with animals—he
carries and consults an animal catalog throughout the novel, fantasizing about what
type of animal he will buy—is complimented by the novel’s other obsession,
empathy. In addition to the empathy being the (alleged) marker of difference
between human and androids, it is also the central characteristic of the novel’s
religion, Mercerism. To be human in the novel is to be empathetic and to be
empathetic requires practice. The novel offers many different possibilities for
practicing empathy, but engaging with animal life is clearly held above all other
possibilities.7
In many ways Dick’s novel is anticipating the importance of interspecies
interaction that Donna Haraway highlights with her concept of companion species
first articulated in The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant
Otherness and later more fully develops in When Species Meet. Describing her
relationship with her dog, Cayenne Pepper, in The Companion Species Manifesto, she
states that they are “constitutively, companion species. We make each other up, in
the flesh. Significantly other to each other in specific difference…” (2-3). For Haraway
then, the human becomes human not by our opposition to animals (liberal
humanism), but rather, through our contact with them. Do Androids Dream of
Electric Sheep pushes Haraway’s observation further by challenging the “in the flesh”

7

The empathy test that Deckard administers to determine if the suspect is human or android largely
revolves around the suspect’s reactions and answers to questions about animals, such as “You are
given a calf skin wallet on your birthday…” (48).
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requirement of co-constitutive engagements. What would—or will—it mean when
“life” is not necessary bound by flesh?
Whereas the Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep explores the co-constitutive
possibilities from interspecies empathetic engagement, Harlan Ellison’s novella “A
Boy and His Dog,” picks up on another concept articulated by Haraway in the opening
pages of The Companion Species Manifesto, love. The second half of Haraway’s
definition of companion species based on her reflection of her relationship with her
Cayenne Pepper is: “Significantly other to each other in specific difference, we signify
in the flesh a nasty developmental infection called love. This love is an historical
aberration and a naturalculture legacy” [emphasis added] (3). Ellison takes up this
odd notion of love with the relationship between the two protagonists of the story, a
teenage boy named Vic and his dog, Blood. The story takes place at a time far
removed from the inevitable anthropocentric apocalypse of the liberal humanism
and, although some humans long for the pre-apocalypse days, those are times that
Vic has never known. Whereas Deckard is bound to the species relations of the preapocalypse world, Vic and Blood are free to define their own relationships.
Therefore, the story allows for an exploration of non-anthropocentric interspecies
engagement that even Haraway falls short of truly imagining.
I conclude by exploring the ramifications of the previous chapter as illustrated
by Mamoru Oshii’s anime film, Ghost in the Shell. The film follows Major Motoko
Kusanagi, a cyborg, in her quest to track down a hacker known as “The Puppet
Master” (later known as Project 2501). Unbeknownst to Kusanagi, Project 2501 is
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also trying to find her. When the two finally meet, Project 2501 explains that it is a
self-aware sentient being that came to life in the “sea of information” that is the
web. It cannot, however, reproduce and therefore seeks to merge with Kusanagi as a
way to reproduce and populate the web with their offspring. This chapter explores
how Ghost in the Shell offers a way beyond the liberal humanist paradigm and the
biopolitical regime without needing an apocalypse through the expansion of the
anthropological limit. Steinbeck’s microbial ethics, which postulate that the singular
duty of all life is to persist, to go on, figure into this chapter as a way to understand
Project 2501’s ethics and to imagine how Steinbeck’s ethics hold up when humans
are no longer the only species that have separated themselves from all others. In
addition, Ghost in the Shell, offers an alternative to Morrison’s character Sethe in
terms of anomie. Ghost in the Shell suggests that the impossible act require to create
anomie may not need to be as traumatic as Sethe’s act. The anomic space may
already be present and the sacrifice required may only be our effort to remain what
we are. Finally, Ghost in the Shell offers a much more plausible end to the liberal
humanist paradigm that it may not need to be obliterated by an apocalypse—it can
simply dissolve under the pressure of ever increasing technological advancement.
This conclusion ends by considering the implications of this dissertation on
our daily lives. What does all this mean and why does it matter? I argue that the
internet itself is an anomic space that, according to the United Nations International
Telecommunications Union, at least three billion people access globally and that this
anomic space, combined with literature, offers all the productive possibility needed
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to expand the anthropological limit and multiply its figures. We may not have a
Project 2501 with which to merge, but we may not need one.
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CHAPTER 2

Poodles Maketh the Man: The “Conspiracy of Life” and the Anthropological Limit in
John Steinbeck’s Travels with Charley: In Search of America

Throughout John Steinbeck’s oeuvre he maintained a consistent focus on the
relationship between humans and the natural world. In his early works, such as his
novel To a God Unknown, his focus was largely on the relationship between humans
and nature—a focus which is also a significant theme in one of his most popular
works, The Grapes of Wrath. However, as Steinbeck’s career progresses and he forms
a close friendship with biologist Ed Ricketts, his focus on humans’ relationship to the
natural world increasingly turns towards the relationship between species. This shift
towards exploring interspecies relationships reaches a crescendo with one of
Steinbeck’s final works, the non-fiction book Travels with Charley: In Search of
America. Interestingly enough, Travels with Charley has often been neglected by
scholars examining Steinbeck’s exploration of the relationship between humans and
the natural world. For example, Mary Allen, in her groundbreaking book Animals in
American Literature, focuses an entire chapter on Steinbeck’s work and ultimately
concludes that by “one means or another, John Steinbeck’s animals are put to death”
(115). Of course Charley, the only animal named in the title of one Steinbeck’s works,
does not get “put to death”—nor does he die at all. In fact, as will be shown, Charley
actually prevents other animals from being “put to death,” and in doing so
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dramatically shifts the way that Steinbeck thinks about humans and their relationship
to other forms of life (animal and non-animal alike). In addition to Allen’s critique,
ecocritical scholars such as Derek Gladwin, Luchen Li and Rodney Rice, have
presented readings of Steinbeck’s work that in one way or another lead to forms of
utopian holism. Again, however, Travels with Charley disrupts these readings with a
radical new conception of life—and by extension, a new ethic. In addition to Allen’s
analysis that insists on an anthropological limit and the ecocritical utopian holism,
the most prominent readings of Steinbeck throughout his career argue that
Steinbeck’s work is evidence in his belief in biological continuum. This chapter seeks
to analyze the conflict between the ecocritical scholars that identify Steinbeck’s work
as firmly positioned in utopian holism and those that position his work as
representations of a biological continuum. These two positions are incompatible.
However, this chapter argues that Steinbeck was not representing utopian holism or
a biological continuum, instead, as demonstrated in Travels with Charley, Steinbeck
was developing his unique understanding of life and in doing so, he creates a radical
new ethic that insists on an absolute anthropological limit between humans and
other forms of life. Steinbeck’s ethic perceives the responsibility between species
deriving not from our shared finitude, but rather, through a unique vision of
fortitude.
Beginning with the ecocritical readings of Steinbeck’s writings it becomes
evident that they invariably end up at a utopian holism that places equal value on
everything that exists in the natural world. Though they vary in their approach and
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intensity, as will be seen through Derek Gladwin, Luchen Li, and Rodney Rice’s
analyses, they all ultimately argue that Steinbeck’s writings contain an identifiable,
consistent and systematic philosophy—one that is based on returning humans back
to their rightful place in the world. The human, the animal, and the plant are all
equals in this schema. In addition, the biotic and the abiotic are also equals. As will be
shown this ultimately complicates the apotheosis of bio-diversity by suggesting that
the multiplication of difference itself is the ultimate ideal, but at the same time, this
difference does not equate to value.
Derek Gladwin’s analysis provides one of the softer approaches to ecocritical
analysis of Steinbeck’s work as he tries to establish a connection between the
characters and narrators and the author’s own views. Gladwin offers a narrower
reading of Steinbeck than Li and Rice, choosing to focus on a single work instead of
multiple works, but reading all three of them in connection clearly establishes a
progression of the ecocritical narrative surrounding Steinbeck’s work. Gladwin calls
attention Steinbeck’s early interests in nature by focusing on his 1933 story, “The Red
Pony”. Gladwin suggests that “The Red Pony” should not be read as a typical
bildungsroman because of the “environmental subtext” present in the narrative.
Instead, it is “Jody’s initiation into an environmental consciousness… [a story] of him
as a boy who is learning, analyzing, and reflecting upon his own biotic community”
(65). Building on the work of Aldo Leopold, one of the most prominent early voices of
environmental ethics in America, Gladwin extends his critique of “The Red Pony” to a
critique of Steinbeck’s over-arching philosophy: “like Leopold, Steinbeck focused on
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ecological concepts in the biotic world, anticipating later theories of ecology and
promoting notions of non-anthropocentrism and holism as part of an environmental
philosophy” (67). Gladwin uses Leopold’s concept of “The Land Ethic” to define the
holism that Steinbeck’s philosophy shares. Gladwin summarizes “The Land Ethic’ as
being the concept that the “land and its complements, plants and animals, make up a
biotic community and are coequal, interdependent parts of a whole” (67). The land
itself therefore becomes a life sustaining force that “continuously flows in a cyclical
manner throughout all the layers of the earth” (67). So the very survival of “each
member of the land pyramid” is predicated on the “inter-reliance and balance of the
overall whole” (67). This philosophy leads Gladwin to conclude his analysis of “The
Red Pony” by suggesting that the development of Jody’s “environmental
consciousness” is only complete when he is capable of “interpreting and evaluating
other human beings and their treatment of the land” (74). Essentially, Jody’s journey
is only complete when he is in the same position that Steinbeck is in—capable of
judging and commentating on humans’ relationship with the land. Gladwin uses his
analysis of Steinbeck’s writing as a bridge to connect the protagonist or narrator to
the author’s own views to argue that that Steinbeck’s primary concern is highlighting
the responsibility that humans have towards the land.
Building on Gladwin’s critique, Luchen Li, the current President of the
International Society for Steinbeck Scholars, states that “in expressing his
[Steinbeck’s] philosophy about the relationship between human beings and nature,
Steinbeck brings the tragedy of the land onto stage” (67). Li argues that the “constant
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struggle between the human species and land has an indispensable implication in
several of Steinbeck’s books” (67). Through his analysis of several of Steinbeck’s
works, Li convincingly demonstrates that Steinbeck is actively writing against the
tradition of American literature by invoking “an opposite rhetoric” that challenges
the image of “the American West...as a place for people to act on their dominant
relationship with nature” (68). Steinbeck’s characters often subscribe to the
traditional view so that, as Li explains, their “desire to conquer the land” becomes
intertwined with “our human instinct to tame and civilize the ‘other,’ the wilderness”
(67). However, as Li explains, Steinbeck is using his characters to illustrate the fault
of modern Man’s actions towards nature and articulate an opposite philosophy
which holds that the “excessive seizure of land, be it for individual or corporate
purposes, makes human beings nature’s enemy and causes individual and national
calamities” (69). Although Li is correct in his view that Steinbeck is writing against the
American literary tradition in terms of the rhetoric of the human/nature
relationships, the vocabulary is imprecise with “wilderness” and “nature” seemingly
being interchangeable. However, the terms are not interchangeable, and a definition
of nature (which Gladwin also does not provide) should be established. Wilderness
can easily be understood as unsettled land, but nature is more challenging to define.
Gladwin and Li both use the term nature to define all that is not human or, by
extension, technological—the natural world—which includes the animate and
inanimate. Therefore, both the untamed “wilderness” and settled land are contained
within nature. In addition, nature makes no distinction between the animate and the
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inanimate—the biotic and the abiotic are equals parts of nature—the rock and the
dog, the fish and the water, etcetera, are all part of nature. Gladwin and Li both see
Steinbeck as attempting to wrest Man from his position outside (and therefore
opposed to) nature and re-establish his place within the all-encompassing natural
world.8 Where Gladwin identifies this as evidence of Steinbeck’s philosophy of
holism, as Rodney Rice argues, Steinbeck can more properly be allied with the more
extreme version of utopian holism, “Deep Ecology.” As Rice explains, “Deep Ecology”
arises out of “calls for the replacement of mechanistic, anthropocentric, Cartesian
thought with a new holistic, ecocentric philosophy that values all elements of
animate and inanimate nature equally” (31). What distinguishes “Deep Ecology” from
other “shallow” ecological thought is that the concern for nature is not based on its
relationship to human, but rather that nature’s value is intrinsic and equal to that of
humans regardless of humans’ relationship to it. For Rice, philosophers of “Deep
Ecology” have not given Steinbeck his proper credit for his remarkable contribution
that quite literally allows for “Deep Ecology” to come into being. As Rice argues,
“Steinbeck, a man who throughout his writing career was firmly connected to earth,
sky, and whose ‘non-teleological’ philosophy provides an important and often
overlooked channel to deep ecological thought” (31). Through a thorough analysis of
Steinbeck’s novel To a God Unknown, published in 1933, the same year as “The Red

8

It is perhaps clearer to think of two independent and incompatible spheres—the first, nature,
contains within it all the biotic and abiotic things that exist without a conscious creator and two, notnature, which contains humans and all their creations (technology). Li is arguing that Steinbeck’s goal
is to pry humans from the not-nature sphere and place them back into the nature sphere where
(according to Li) they belong. Therefore, the not-nature sphere now only contains technology and the
new conflict between spheres is not humans and nature, but nature and technology.
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Pony”, Rice arrives at three principles of Steinbeck’s philosophy that would later be
mirrored in “Deep Ecology.” First, a radical shift in human thinking—one that will
require sacrifice—can allow for identification with “primal natural forces” (48).
Second, “humans are not more important than any other species” and therefore
“maintaining and respecting diversity and plentitude of all forms of life is essential to
long-term survival and environmental quality” (48). In other words, biodiversity is
privileged above individual life and human civilization. Third, the wound caused by
placing humans outside (or above) the non-human natural world must be healed—it
is not a utopian desire, but rather, an urgent “need” (48). Ultimately Rice argues that
Steinbeck’s philosophy, which began with “non-teleological” thinking, will be
extended in the decades to come, culminating in “Deep Ecology.”
As mentioned, the environmental approach to analyzing Steinbeck’s writing
and devising a philosophy or ethic from it is the most common. While Steinbeck’s
concern with the environment—and humans’ relationship to it—is undeniable, the
reduction of his work to a romantic holism, or worse an eco-moralism, negates the
radical potential present in Steinbeck’s work. While ecological based philosophies,
such as “Deep Ecology” have been critiqued and criticized on their merits—with
philosophers such as Luc Ferry going as far as characterizing them as anti-democratic
totalitarianism—the point here is not to offer more commentary on eco-philosophy,
but to instead suggest that Steinbeck’s writing is more nuanced. It is impossible to
present an overarching narrative of Steinbeck’s philosophy without considering
Travels with Charley. It is in Travels with Charley that Steinbeck finally fully develops
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the nascent philosophy scattered throughout his other works. Whereas the ecocritical readings of Steinbeck culminate with the apotheosis of bio-diversity in “Deep
Ecology”—that effectively removes all value from specificity, from individual life—
Steinbeck’s actual philosophy culminates in Travels with Charley with a vision that
does not trivialize individual life but rather seeks to connect each life through their
common attributes of persistence and fortitude. With that said, before proceeding it
is necessary to consider the other critics that have recognized the conflict between
the totalitarian tendencies of “Deep Ecology” and Steinbeck’s championing of
egalitarian principles through his narratives and have offered an alternative to
reconcile these seeming contradictions—biological continuism.
The notion that Steinbeck believes in a biological continuum has been present
since the beginning of his career. Interestingly, as James C. Kelley notes in “The
Global Appeal of Steinbeck’s Science: The Animal-Human Connections,” an excellent
survey that traces change from the contemporary responses to Steinbeck’s work at
the time of their publication and the increasing attention those works received over
time, the early critics argued that this was one of Steinbeck’s greatest faults. Kelly
notes that critics “complained that he was obsessed with the animals and reduced
humans to the level of animals, stripping them of all the noble qualities of humanity
as we know it” (256). In other words, Steinbeck’s contemporary critics often cited his
use of animals as evidence of his heresy and lack of reverence for humanity.
However, as Kelley suggests and presumably to the dismay of Steinbeck’s
contemporary critics, the enduring popularity of Steinbeck’s fiction and the increased
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attention on what were his less successful works can be directly to his
“understanding of the evolutionary thread that binds together all living things” (256).
Kelley continues, “The ‘animalizing tendencies’ of John Steinbeck are becoming
rather fashionable, and this contributes to his continued popularity” (256-57). The
“animalizing tendencies” that are becoming “fashionable” are a result of the
increased willingness to accept a biological continuum. Kelley emphasizes this stating
that while “humans may sometimes be distinguished from animals by our desire to
understand the thoughts of others, our sense of morality, our facility with language
or even our understanding of death, a good deal of scholarly activity seems to be
converging on the idea of a continuum” (263). Though opposed to Mary Allen’s
understanding of animals in Steinbeck’s work—the notion of a biological continuum
as central to Steinbeck’s philosophy is prominent and seemingly supported by his
work.
Interestingly enough, much like the ecocritical readings of Steinbeck, the
biological continuum readings are largely centered on his early works and largely
ignore Travels With Charley. Though the latter is less focused on To a God Unknown
and more focused on Cannery Row—the two approaches share the Log from the Sea
of Cortez as a foundational text (which Allen also uses to ground her argument
against a continuum). Three important aspects of the Log from the Sea of Cortez are
utilized as evidence of Steinbeck’s belief in a biological continuum: Steinbeck
observation of a tide pool, group-man theory, and the concept of utility. The latter
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two are both dependent on the importance of the tide pool—or perhaps it is better
to say that both arise out of the tide pool.
The tide pool metaphor is undoubtedly one of Steinbeck’s most important
and most discussed. Comparing himself and Ed Rickets to biologists that are only
interested in the “rarity” and uniqueness of an animal, he states that their “interest
lay in the in the relationships of animal to animal” (178). This comparison leads him
to contemplate the tide pool and life in general:
If one observes in this relational sense, it seems apparent that species
are only commas in a sentence, that each species is at once the point
and the base of a pyramid, that all life is relational to the point where
an Einsteinian relativity seems to emerge. And then not only the
meaning but the feeling about species grows misty. One merges into
another, groups melt into ecological groups until the time when what
we know as life meets and enters what we think of as non-life:
barnacle and rock, rock and earth, earth and tree, tree and rain and
air. And the units nestle into the whole and are inseparable from it.
Then one can come back to the microscope and the tide pool and the
aquarium. But the little animals are found to be changed, no longer
set apart and alone. (178)
The evidence of biological continuism is readily apparent here. It is also easy to see
how this passage could be interpreted as ecological holism with the blurring between
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biotic (the barnacle) and the abiotic (the rock). Steinbeck continues his meditation by
incorporating the religious and mystic:
And it is a strange thing that most of the feeling we call religious, most
of the mystical outcrying which is one of the most prized and used and
desired reactions of our species, is really the understanding and the
attempt to say that man is related to the whole thing, related
inextricably to all reality , known and unknowable...knowledge that all
things are one all things— plankton, a shimmering phosphorescence
on the sea and the spinning planets and an expanding universe, all
bound together by the elastic string of time. It is advisable to look
from the tide pool to the stars and then back to the tide pool again.
(178-79)
The final sentence, the call to look from the tide pool to the stars and then back to
the tide pool, extends Steinbeck’s metaphor from the earth to the heavens. The tide
pool is thus a microcosm of the macrocosm that is earth—the earth is thus a
microcosm of the macrocosm that is the universe. Certainly the elegance of
Steinbeck’s prose enhances the effect of his observation and lures one towards some
form of cosmic unity—a cosmic holism. Indeed, the group-man theory, which
Josephine Levy defines as the concept that “any individual is also part of a larger life
form,” would suggest the possibility of infinite expansion—the individual is part of
the community, the community is part of the species, and so on and so forth until
everything is part of everything else (67). Again this seems to lead to holism;
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however, what distinguishes the biological continuum readings from the ecological
readings is value and utility. Holism as represented by Deep Ecology privileges only
diversity, whereas biological continuum understands value and utility. Valuing
difference for difference sake, as Deep Ecology does, is as useless as the biologists
that Steinbeck dismisses that only value rarity. What matters for biological
continuism then is understanding the relationship “of animal to animal,” while also
factoring in utility. There is no apotheosis of diversity in the biological continuum and
therefore, though all life is linked—the possibility of a hierarchy remains. Whereas
utopian holism in its furthest extension, “Deep Ecology,” grants no value distinction
between lifeforms, biological continuism allows for the privileging of certain beings
over others. Essentially, utopian holism argues that between the various forms of life,
there are only differences of kind, whereas biological continuism argues that there
are differences in degree between lifeforms.9
Gregory MacDonald highlights the importance of utility and understanding
“relationships” in his article, “Different Perspectives from the Sea of Cortez,” by
drawing attention to the discrepancy between many readers and Steinbeck’s
reactions to Japanese shrimp boats. MacDonald assumes that “most readers of The
Log have been saddened—if not horrified—to hear Steinbeck’s account of the
Japanese Shrimp fishing operation in the upper Sea of Cortez in 1940” (91). The
Japanese were trawling the ocean floor for shrimp, which of course results in the
9

This is also one of the more concerning aspects of biological continuism. Without an absolute break
between species, it is possible to articulate dangerous ethnocentric arguments about difference of
degree, rather than of kind, between groups within the same species. In other words, it opens up the
possibility of not seeing all humans as human—as will be demonstrated in the proceeding chapters.
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death of everything else in the area. Since the Japanese were only interested in the
shrimp, everything else, now dead, was thrown back into to the water. As MacDonald
notes, “Steinbeck did not view the wholesale destruction of marine life” as the
tragedy that it was because he believed “that nothing would be wasted as it made its
way down the food chain” (91). MacDonald points to the following passage in The
Log from the Sea of Cortez:
To Tiny the fisherman, having as his function not only the catching of
fish but the presumption that they would be eaten by humans, the
Japanese were wasteful. And in that picture he was very correct. But
all the fish actually were eaten; if any small parts were missed by the
birds they were taken by the detritus-eaters, the worms and
cucumbers. And what they missed was reduced by the bacteria. What
was the fisherman’s loss was a gain to another group. We tried to say
that in the macrocosm nothing is wasted, the equation always
balances. The elements which the fish elaborated into an individuated
physical organism, a microcosm, go back again into the
undifferentiated macrocosm which is the great reservoir. There is not,
nor can there be, any actual waste, but simply varying forms of
energy. (217-18)
So what his fishermen shipmates perceive as wasteful because they view fish only in
their utility for humans, Steinbeck does not see as wasteful because other forms of
life will benefit from the barrels of death being dumped back into the sea. Unlike like
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the holist or deep ecologists who prize only diversity, Steinbeck here is praising utility
above all. The “wholesale destruction of marine life” is acceptable because the
deaths have a use—to provide food for other species. MacDonald does not quote the
rest of the passage, which continues:
To each group, of course, there must be waste —the dead fish to man,
the broken pieces to gulls, the bones to some and the scales to
others— but to the whole, there is no waste. The great organism, Life,
takes it all and uses it all. The large picture is always clear and the
smaller can be clear— the picture of eater and eaten. And the large
equilibrium of the life of a given animal is postulated on the presence
of abundant larvae of just such forms as itself for food. Nothing is
wasted; “no star is lost.” (218)
Again, the beauty of Steinbeck’s rhetoric (“the great organism”) leads one to feel an
affinity with some sort of cosmic holism—but when we consider his focus on the
“relationships” between species, it becomes evident that he is speaking of a
continuum, in which each species blends into the next with no abrupt ruptures.
Therefore, while a biological continuum does place humans on the same plane as
animals, it does not maintain the same reverence for difference that deep ecology
and holism. In other words, difference itself is no longer the only holder of value,
instead, the significance of the difference between lifeforms is the determiner of
individual value. Instead of the apotheosis of biodiversity that is found in utopian
holism and the only goal being that of maximizing difference, biological continuism
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allows for an ordering of species, where some species are inevitably more valuable
than others. If the last pig alive could keep a human family from starving to death,
then the human family is not ethically obligated to refrain from eating that pig to
maximize difference. The ethical relationship then is not one of preventing death or
of minimal impact, but instead of usefulness and purposefulness. This is clearly
evident when they harpoon a sea-turtle and are “able to observe the tender hearts of
our crew.” After harpooning the turtle and bringing it on board the ship, Tiny, the
crew member responsible for the harpooning was “seized” by “remorse” (38). The
turtle is finally decapitated with an axe and as a “large quantity of very red blood
poured from the trunk of the neck” and the “flippers waved frantically,” Steinbeck is
“eager to examine this turtle” and therefore, “put[s] Tiny’s emotion aside for the
moment” (38). Steinbeck does not possess any of the sentimental emotions towards
the turtle that Tiny and the other crew members do. There is nothing unethical—
nothing worth mourning—in this event.
Both utopian holism (“cosmic unity”) and the notion of a biological continuum
are ethically dubious because of the precarious position that they place human life in
when followed to their logical extension—for utopian holism it is the apotheosis of
biodiversity which renders individual life valueless and for biological continuism it the
possibility of ordering within species, the possibility of drawing a distinction of
degree within species. Mary Allen, on the other hand, presents a unique reading of
Steinbeck that argues that the tide pool and the turtle scene are actually evidence
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that a biological continuum does not exist in Steinbeck’s work.10 Allen states that
despite the concept of a “cosmic unity” pervading the work, “the central image of a
biological universe, the tide pool, is devoid of the humanity that Steinbeck makes the
basis for union in human society, a humanity his people do not extend to animals”
(116). Therefore, in Steinbeck’s philosophy, “animals exist to be used by man” (116).
Allen is breaking with both ecological holism (“cosmic unity”) and the notion of a
biological continuum to reinstate an absolute anthropological limit between humans
and animals. There is the animal world, represented by the life in the tide pool, and
then there is the observer of the tide pool—separate and distinct, the human. Allen
concludes:
Thus animals fall under the dominion of men, who kill them with skill
and detachment, out of necessity and for amusement. They are rarely
considered to have sensations. While human dignity depends upon
ascendance over the creatures, it is very often boredom and
gratification in power that lead to the many deaths in Steinbeck’s
animal kingdom. It serves him well, allowing a freedom to enjoy blood
that would not be his in a world limited to man. (133)
Allen’s reading has some significant flaws, however, her work is extremely important
because she is able to pry Steinbeck from the hands of the utopian holist and she
10

Mary Allen is a particularly important scholar to consider because her book, Animals in American
Literature, is one of the first scholarly works to specifically attempt to analyze animals across the
entire oeuvre of various American authors. Unlike other scholars that approach interspecies analysis
by examining how the animals are metaphoric devices for human characters, Allen wants to
understand the animals on their own terms and draw her conclusions based on their treatment in the
writings. Allen is much more in line with contemporary Animal Studies in her scholarly approach and
interestingly, it is with Steinbeck that she presents the harshest reading.
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rightfully rescues his philosophy from the risks of biological continuism. With that
said, Allen’s essay has some significant internal shortcomings—the most glaring being
her implicit implication of the “human dignity thesis” that James C. Kelley identifies
at the heart of the early negative critiques of Steinbeck. Kelley argues that this thesis
“argues in favor of a separate and, of course, superior role of humans in the cosmos”
(258). Kelley identifies both a religious version of the thesis, which claims supremacy
because “humans are created in the image of God,” and a secular version, which
argues that “humans are special because of their unique rationality” (258). When
Allen claims that “human dignity depends upon ascendance over the creatures” she
is invoking this thesis. Of course, the problem with that is that Darwinism—of which
Steinbeck is clearly a student of—completely undermines the “the human dignity
thesis.” Indeed, considering the criticisms that Steinbeck received early in his career,
it was largely his willingness to undermine this thesis that provoked such hostilities.
Therefore, while Allen is correct in her notion against a biological continuism in
Steinbeck’s work, her conclusion on why this is so is inaccurate and this in largely the
result of her locating the evidence for his anti-continuism only in The Log from the
Sea of Cortez.
At the time that Steinbeck was writing The Log from the Sea of Cortez, a
nascent ethic does indeed seem to be leaning towards the notion of a biological
continuism. However, while Allen is correct to sense a hesitation to fully commit to
continuism in Steinbeck’s writing, it is not until he writes Travels with Charley that he
is able to fully resolve the conflict. Steinbeck’s reluctance to subscribe fully to
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biological continuism, though never explicitly acknowledged, likely stems from an
awareness of the risk that comes from fully dissolving the anthropological limit—the
limit that separates humans from animals.
French philosopher Jacque Derrida also grapples with the problem of
attacking the anthropological limit during his ten hour address to the 1997 Cerisy
conference, later published under the title The Animal That Therefore I am. Derrida,
recognizing that his address, by attacking the anthropological limit, could be seen as
invoking a biological continuism—much like Steinbeck’s critics claim of his work—
explicitly addresses the issue insisting on his innocence. Derrida states that he has
“never believed in some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and
what he calls the animal. I am not about to begin so now” (30). Indeed, Derrida insists
that it is impossible for anyone to deny the limit that separates the human and the
animal and that one should be suspicious of anyone that invokes a continuism,
stating:
When that cause or interest seeks to profit from what it simplistically
suspects to be a biologistic continuism, whose sinister connotations
we are well aware of, or more generally to profit from what is
suspected as a geneticism that one might wish to associate with this
scatterbrained accusation of continuism, at that point the undertaking
becomes in any case so aberrant that it neither calls for nor, it seems
to me, deserves any direct discussion on my part. (30)
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Although Derrida assumes his audience is “well aware” of the “sinister connotations”
of biological continuism it may not be immediately evident. Leonard Lawlor clarifies
in his book on Derrida’s talk, This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human
Nature in Derrida, that “if one raises animals to the level of humans, or if one lowers
humans to the level of animals, one ignores the difference that requires living beings
to be treated in a variety of ways.” Essentially, the “sinister connotations” of
biological continuism are that under such a regime every imaginable violence
becomes permissible. Steinbeck, with his obvious concern for the downtrodden,
seems attuned to this possibility as is evident by his reluctance to throw Man into the
tide pool with all other life. However, it is not until Travels with Charley that
Steinbeck articulates a forceful dismissal of biological continuism and offers an
alternative attack on the anthropological limit.
Travels with Charley: In Search of America is a non-fiction travelogue that
recounts Steinbeck’s cross-country road trip in the later years of his life.11 When
Steinbeck and Charley make their way through the South the importance of the
anthropological limit become apparent. As they make their way across Texas towards
Louisiana they stop at a gas station and the attendant remarks, “’Hey, it’s a dog! I
thought you had a nigger in there’” (182). Steinbeck continues “And he laughed

11

Bill Steigerwald, a freelance journalist, publish a book entitled Dogging Steinbeck: Discovering
America and Exposing the Truth about 'Travels With Charley', which claims to expose Steinbeck’s
narrative as a complete fraud. Steigerwald rests his claim on his own attempt to recreate Steinbeck’s
journey and some inaccuracies and omissions in Steinbeck’s text—for instance, Steinbeck does not
mention the frequency that he met up with his wife at luxury hotels during the trip. Steigerwald’s
“exposé” ultimately hinges on treating Steinbeck as journalist and not as the literary author that he
clearly was—as a writer Steinbeck takes literary liberties when needed and that does not detract from
the narratives themselves.
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delightedly. It was the first of many repetitions. At least twenty times I heard it—
“Thought you had a nigger in there.” It was an unusual joke— always fresh— and
never Negro or even Nigra, always Nigger or rather Niggah. That word seemed
terribly important, a kind of safety word to cling to lest some structure collapse”
(182). This scene foreshadows the atrocious behavior of the “cheerleaders”—“stout
middle-aged [white] women who, by some curious definition of the word ‘mother,’
gathered every day to scream invectives at children”—that protest the integration of
public schools in New Orleans. The reoccurring joke of confusing Charley with an
African American and the importance of the word “nigger”—though never
interrogated by Steinbeck—are important to understanding the dangers in attacking
that anthropological limit. Again, without the insistence of an absolute limit(absolute
alterity)—that claims on one side of the abyssal rupture stands all of humanity,
unique and different from all other life and on the other side of this rupture stands all
animal life, absolutely different from human life—then it becomes possible to order
and rank within species. Because there is no limit, the Southerners are arguing that
along the continuum, black Americans are closer to Charley than they are to white
Americans.
Steinbeck, without remark, highlights the two logics of racism on a biological
continuum. The first, which “a dear Southern friend…passionately” instructs
Steinbeck in, is the “the theory of ‘equal but separate’” (180). This theory attempts to
account for the innate humanness of black Americans (and presumably other nonCaucasians) while maintaining the separation that the seeing the other as wholly
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other once provided—and therefore, the ability to treat differently. This first logic,
however, does nothing to absolve Americans for their past atrocities. Absolution
comes by invoking the joke about mistaking Charley for an African American—the
result of a dissolution of the anthropological limit. The mistake—a joke that is not in
jest—hinges on the notion of a biological continuum that aligns the difference of the
African American from the Caucasian with the same difference as the poodle from
the Caucasian. Therefore, the joke that is not in jest is a joke because it is an honest
mistake. As previously mentioned, the regime of biological continuism allows for
every imaginable violence to be permissible because there is nothing that dictates
absolute alterity between beings. All difference then, every otherness, is of degree
not kind.
Thus Steinbeck, like Derrida, not only recognizes, but also insists on the
anthropological limit. Again, although Steinbeck’s early work may be seen as
embracing a biological continuum, by Travels with Charley, it is clear that such a
notion is rejected. The year that Travels with Charley was published in 1962, two
years after the actual trip, Steinbeck was also awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.
If there was any lingering doubt after Travels with Charley about Steinbeck’s rejection
of biological continuism, his banquet speech to the Swedish Academy should dispel
any doubt. The entire speech, framed by addressing the duty of the writer (poet), is
about the uniqueness of the human species. Steinbeck forcefully asserts, “I hold that
a writer who does not passionately believe in the perfectibility of man, has no
dedication nor any membership in literature.” The anthropological limit is evoked in
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this statement by both attesting to the “perfectibility of man”—that is to say Man as
the species with a relationship and awareness of the self—and by linking that
possibility of perfectibility to writing, to logos, to techne, to the uniquely human.
Steinbeck continues to enforce the anthropological limit concluding his speech as
follows:
We have usurped many of the powers we once ascribed to God.
Fearful and unprepared, we have assumed lordship over the life or
death of the whole world—of all living things. The danger and the
glory and the choice rest finally in man. The test of his perfectibility is
at hand. Having taken Godlike power, we must seek in ourselves for
the responsibility and the wisdom we once prayed some deity might
have. Man himself has become our greatest hazard and our only hope.
So that today, St. John the apostle may well be paraphrased: In the
end is the Word, and the Word is Man - and the Word is with Men.
Although this may appear to be the apotheosis of Man—it is actually the apotheosis
of Man and techne. “Godlike power” is not bestowed upon Man, but instead “taken”
by Man, which is to say that it is Man gives the power of God to himself through
technology—through the word, through writing. In any case, it is evident that there
is abyssal rupture (the anthropological limit) between Man and all other life. This is
further reinforced in Travels with Charley when Steinbeck states “Then processes of
change and variation took place in the organisms, so that one kind became different
from all others” (158). Man is the “one kind of life different from all others,” the limit
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is absolute. Although this may seem to support Mary Allen’s argument that animals
exist to be used by Man, her thesis is undercut by the Steinbeck’s insistence on
focusing on the relationships between species and his persistence in trying to define
and articulate these relationships. Too much care and time and thought are given to
the relationships between species to simply fall back into the biblical binary in which
Man has dominion over all other life. Although Man may be observing the tide pool,
it is not a metaphysical separation. For when Man glances back down from the stars
to the tide pool and reaches his hand in, he is no longer an observer but a participant.
Man is not separated from the life in the tide pool the way that the stars are
separated from the earth. The earth itself becomes the tide pool and Man is
swimming along with all other life on this planet—unique and distinct, but a
participant nonetheless. Thus the tide pool is not a microcosm of the cosmos, but
instead, as Steinbeck remarks in Travels With Charley, “the macrocosm of microcosm
me” (153).
In many ways then, Steinbeck shares the same task as Derrida, which Leonard
Lawlor identifies in Derrida as attempting to find a way to avoid both biological
continuism and metaphysical separation. As Derrida explains, in order to accomplish
this task, the anthropological limit must be thought of not as indivisible, but rather
abyssal. Derrida states:
Not just because it [the subject of his talk/project] will concern what
sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the
limit, but also what feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and
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complicates it. Everything I’ll say will consist, certainly not in effacing
the limit, but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, thickening,
delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it
increase and multiply. (29)
The most important way that he complicates the limit is by denouncing the word
Animal—“a word that men have given themselves the right to give” (32). He
continues: “Men would be first and foremost those living creatures who have given
themselves the word that enables them to speak of the animal with a single voice
and to designate it as the single being” (32). Animal, therefore, is what is primarily
responsible for the establishment of the anthropological limit as single and indivisible
because it collapses every other being into a single category—Man and Animal, Man
and not-Man—there is no Other of the Other only Other of Man. Derrida continues:
“We have to envisage the existence of “living creatures,” whose plurality cannot be
assembled within the single figure of an animality that is simply opposed to
humanity” (47). He conceives of this plurality with the neologism, animot. Matthew
Calarco clarifies this neologism explaining that “animot sounds like animaux, animals
in the plural. Derrida wants us to hear in the term animot animals in their plural
singularity rather than their generality (i.e., The Animal)” (Zoographies). The “plural
singularity” rather than “generality” that Derrida is attempting to articulate then is
that while there is an abyssal rupture between human and non-human animals, there
are also equally important ruptures between species and the ruptures between
humans and other species are not identical. This is evident by Steinbeck and
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Charley’s relationship. The limit between human and dog is much different than the
limit between human and octopus. Therefore, by restoring the multiplicity of beings
and emphasizing the difference between them, Derrida opens up the possibility of
bioethics by focusing on the relationships between beings. To acknowledge the
multiplicity of life—much like Steinbeck. Where the two diverge however, is in what
this acknowledgement means for evaluating bioethics and the origin of our
responsibility towards other species.
Derrida locates the origin of this responsibility, the origin of ethics, in every
species shared finitude. Every being, regardless of species, shares the inevitability of
death. The implications of this in Derrida’s work before his own death are never fully
teased out. However, in the years after Derrida’s death, Posthumanist scholar Cary
Wolfe attempts to further flesh out the implications in Derrida’s work. In his book,
What is Posthumanism, Wolfe expertly outlines the various attempts to escape the
Cartesian (or Kantian) binary by seriously considering the existence of animals and
our relationships to actual (not conceptual or figurative) animals and heterogeneity.
Wolfe exposes the faults in the utilitarian and contractarian approaches to bioethics
as mere re-inscriptions liberal humanism that reduce the “questions of justice to
questions of entitlement” or to sympathetic extension of compassion out of human
nobility (79). Instead, Wolfe, in the footsteps of Cora Diamond and Derrida, insists
that what we must understand and evaluate in our consideration of our relationships
to animals is “that the fundamental ethical bond we have with nonhuman animals
resides in our shared finitude, our vulnerability and mortality as ‘fellow creatures’”
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(80). Therefore, it is this “vulnerability and, ultimately, mortality that we share with
non-human animals” at the core of ethics that elevates bioethics beyond “mere
kindness” to “justice” (81). Indeed, as Wolfe explains, for Derrida properly
considering our relationship to animals is essential because we do not have access to
our own finitude. As Wolfe explains “we never have an idea of what death is for us—
indeed, death is precisely that which can never be for us” (83). Therefore,
acknowledging our shared finitude, which is our only access to death, requires the
recognition of the animal other. In the space of the recognition is where ethics as
justice becomes a possibility.
The location of ethical obligation in the presence of shared finitude—ethics as
the result of eventual death—however, is not present in Steinbeck. Instead,
Steinbeck locates ethics in shared fortitude—the persistence of life to survive. The
most important scene in Travels with Charley, which mirrors the introspection that
occurs when gazing at the tide pool, occurs when Steinbeck stops in the Mojave to
give Charley some much needed water. In the distance Steinbeck notices two coyotes
and instinctively grabs his gun because “coyotes are vermin” (213). However, as “the
coyote sat down like a dog”—like Charley would do—Steinbeck begins to question
his “ancient conditioning” that tells him the coyote “are the enemy” and refuses to
kill them. This “ancient conditioning” is the single and indivisible binary limit between
Man and Animal—where Man must exercise his power on animals to assure himself
of his own being. In recognizing the coyote’s similarity to Charley, and Charley’s
similarity to himself, Steinbeck is forced once again, exactly two decades after his trip
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to the Sea of Cortez, to consider the relationship and responsibility that Man has to
all other life. And it is here that Steinbeck distinguishes himself from Diamond,
Derrida and Wolfe. Steinbeck states:
When, very late in the history of our planet, the incredible accident of
life occurred, a balance of chemical factors, combined with
temperature, in quantities and in kinds so delicate as to be unlikely, all
came together in the retort of time and a new thing emerged, soft and
helpless and unprotected in the savage world of unlife. Then processes
of change and variation took place in the organisms, so that one kind
became different from all others. But one ingredient, perhaps the
most important of all, is planted in every life form— the factor of
survival. No living thing is without it, nor could life exist without this
magic formula. Of course, each form developed its own machinery for
survival, and some failed and disappeared while others peopled the
earth. The first life might easily have been snuffed out and the
accident may never have happened again— but, once it existed, its
first quality, its duty , preoccupation, direction, and end, shared by
every living thing, is to go on living. (217)
This is a radically different configuration of ethics from Derrida and Wolfe. Rather
than our responsibility to the animal Other being based on the possibility of death—
or the certainty of eventual death—Steinbeck is suggesting that our responsibility to
the animal Other lies in our mutual fortitude. Rather than ethics as a shared
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“vulnerability” that makes the practice of ethics a passivity (which explains Derrida’s
dismissal of vegetarianism), Steinbeck is articulating an active ethics—ethics as the
very practice of life itself—the persistence to, or rather the duty to continue living
and to promote life itself in all forms. Continuing his meditation on the desert
Steinbeck remarks: “I find most interesting the conspiracy of life in the desert to
circumvent the death rays of the all-conquering sun. The beaten earth appears
defeated and dead, but it only appears so. A vast and inventive organization of living
matter survives by seeming to have lost” (216). This “conspiracy of life” is the heart
of Steinbeck’s ethics. All life’s singular duty, it’s only obligation, is to continue—to
persist, to evolve, to remain. Ethics are no longer the result of a shared vulnerability,
but rather a shared responsibility, and therefore, ethics extends beyond just Man. In
this configuration, because ethics are now the singular duty to participate in the
“conspiracy of life” against unlife, the expanse of ethics extends beyond just humans.
All other life, by virtue of its existence, is actively carrying out its ethical obligations.
In this sense too, then, Man becomes the only form of life that is not always already
ethical—that is to say that through technology Man is capable of no longer
participating in the “conspiracy of life.” Through technology Man has “allied itself
with the enemy non-life.”12 Man has the capability to eliminate all known life and this
possibility means that Man is not actively fulfilling their ethical responsibility.
Furthermore, Steinbeck’s ethic allows for the heterogeneity that Derrida and Wolfe
12

Although Steinbeck is surely thinking of nuclear weapons as being the technology that could finally
extinguish life, since the publication of Travels With Charley the technologies that ally Man with nonlife have only multiplied. From ecological calamities brought on by man made changes to the climate
to the always present fears of the results of the rapidly approaching singularity.
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desire (Posthumanism 90). While Derrida speaks of expanding and multiplying the
abyssal ruptures at the anthological limit, it is the heterogeneity that Steinbeck’s
ethics allow that Derrida and subsequently, Wolfe, are speaking about. Rather than
ethics as uniformity, to be applied in the same manner at all times, ethics must be
seen in heterogeneous specificity. That is to say that there is no universal application
of ethics, only specific relationships between individual participants. A universal ethic
would see Steinbeck’s capture and dissection of the turtle and his refusing to shoot
the coyotes as hypocritical. However, because Steinbeck’s ethics are heterogeneous,
then the individual participants as well as all the surrounding circumstances (needs,
outcomes, historical moment, et cetera) are required to evaluate the ethical
obligations. It is not the apotheosis of biodiversity that utopian holism champions. If
eradicating a certain lifeform (perhaps a virus) will protect and promote the
continuing of other lifeforms even though it reduces biodiversity can be seen as
ethical—indeed, this notion of life as that which persists through evolution, requires
the extinction of an untold number of species. In addition, Steinbeck not only
maintains this heterogeneity, but expands it. Unlike Derrida and Wolfe, who are only
concerned with Man and animals, Steinbeck is concerned with all life. Steinbeck’s
ethics therefore, can be seen as microbial ethics—ethics that are concerned with all
life, with the biotic.
The microbial ethics located in the shared fortitude of the biotic have
profound implications for our conception of the anthropological limit. What then
defines Man—what makes the human “different from all others”—is our possibility
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of being unethical through our alliance with the technologies capable of expanding
“unlife.” Microbial ethics make the ethical inherent to life. All life, by virtue of its
own existence, is actively ethical as it strives to reproduce, to mutate, to evolve and
to persist. Therefore, rather than seeing ethics, along with logos and techne, as that
which separates Man from all other beings, Steinbeck aligns the presence of active
practice of ethics in all other life. What distinguishes Man from all life then is that
ethics is no longer an always already being practice. Man must choose to act in ways
that promote the continuance of life in all its multiplicity. As Steinbeck says, “we have
assumed lordship over the life or death of the whole world - of all living things” and it
is the lordship over Death that that allies us with the enemy of life, unlife. Thus, “the
perfectibility of Man” arises in the persistence of being ethical—the promotion of the
persistence of life while wielding the technologies of annihilation—the “perfectibility
of Man” lies in life’s immortality.
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CHAPTER 3

The Practice of Becoming Human: Interspecies Interaction in Toni Morrison’s Beloved
and The Bluest Eye

Uprooted from his natural habitat, stolen from his kind, a parrot shivers in the
windowsill of a hostile foreign climate. He has never seen snow and was not meant
to feel cold, yet here he is, alone, trembling and terrified. Unsure of what to do, he
falls back on what has always worked in the before and mutters, “I love you” (3). Of
course, there is no response.
This is the opening scene of Toni Morrison’s novel Jazz. From Bob the dog in
The Bluest Eye to Sorrow's mystical mermaids and whales in A Mercy, Morrison
scatters animals and animal imagery throughout her work, and clearly, she feels their
use is important enough to be included in the opening pages of her novels. The
scholars that have examined this aspect of Morrison’s work, such as Tuire Valkeakari
and Vera Norwood, have approached it from an anthropocentric perspective by
exploring how animals are used to demonstrate the way African Americans are
dehumanized in order to justify their oppression. The other common critical
approach, found in the work of Greta Gaard and others, is to insist that the animals
are either allegorical or mere plot devices. In both these scholarly trajectories, the
animals become nothing more than narrative tools to illustrate the problems of the
human characters. Unfortunately, these approaches are largely trapped in the
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traditions of liberal humanist discourse and therefore, insufficiently address the
significance of the animals in Morrison’s work. As the speciesist logics of liberal
humanism and biologism continues to be discredited in science as well as philosophy
it would seem appropriate to approach the animals in Morrison’s work from a nonanthropocentric framework13. Instead, Morrison's project is not only to re-write the
history of African-Americans, but to also re-imagine the role of animals in our society
and the relationships between species, or perhaps, to even re-imagine the notion of
species itself.
Although every Morrison novel features animals or animal imagery, in the
context of understanding species and interspecies interactions, two novels
particularly stand out. First, Morrison’s most famous novel Beloved, for its
implication of biologism (biological continuism) as a foundation of law and the
impossible action that must be taken as the only form of resistance. And second, The
Bluest Eye, Morrison’s first novel, for its interrogation of the productive possibilities
of reciprocity in interspecies relationships in the practice of “becoming-with.”

13

Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation published in 1975 is perhaps the most well-known attack on
speciesism, although, as Carey Wolfe (in What is Posthumanism?) and others (Cora Diamond) have
since argued, Singer still demonstrates a commitment to liberal humanism. It is with the rise of the
French anti-humanist, particularly Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, that the inseparable entwinement
of speciesism and humanism is fully acknowledge. Since Deleuze and Guattari other noted
philosophers, primarily Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben and Carey Wolfe, have continued to
demonstrate the need to pose alternatives to liberal humanism if there is any hope to get beyond
speciesism. In addition to the philosophical move away from liberal humanism, biological sciences
have also called into question many of the distinctions between humans and animals that liberal
humanism relies upon. There is of course the much publicized work with primates done by Jane
Goodall and the equally important, though less famous, Barbara Smuts; Andrea Turkalo’s work with
Elephants and studies of Elephants communication/language; and the rise of cognitive ethologists,
most notably Mark Bekoff. In addition, the blurring of biological and technological sciences in many
fields (e.g. N. Katherine Hayles and Dominic Pettman’s work) is rapidly evaporating what little
substance liberal humanism has left.
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Beloved is undoubtedly Morrison’s most well-known work and it is also one of
her most complex. Ostensibly it is the story of Sethe and her children’s escape from
slavery in the South and the aftermath of the atrocity that Sethe commits when the
plantation overseer tracks her down in the North. However, the complexity of the
novel arises because it is not simply an indictment of the institution of slavery;
instead it is a thorough attack on the forces that create the conditions that allow for
such an institution to exist—namely, liberal humanism and biologism.
French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, during his address at the 1997 Cérisy
conference, later published as The Animal That Therefore I am¸ is completely
conscious of the dangers of biologism and makes a point to make sure that his own
thoughts are not seen as endorsing biologism. Derrida remarks, “I have thus never
believed in some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what
he calls the animal. I am not about to begin to do so now. That would be worse than
sleepwalking, it would simply be too asinine” (30). He continues on to suggest that
any suggestion of biologism would be a “stupid memory lapse” because of the
“sinister connotations we are well aware of” (30). Although he does not explain the
“sinister connotations” in his address, Leonard Lawler explains it more fully in his
essay about Derrida, entitled This is not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human
Nature in Derrida. Lawler clarifies:
This risk of biologism is really the risk of a direct attack on the
difference between animals and humans. If one raises animals to the
level of humans, or if one lowers humans to the level of animals, one
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ignores the difference that requires living beings to be treated in a
variety of ways. With a direct approach, either humans are going to be
treated like animals or animals like humans.
In addition to Lawler’s clarification, it is not just that “humans are going to be treated
like animals or animals like humans,” it is that some humans can be “treated like
animals.” It is not an all or nothing proposition as will be seen in Morrison’s work.
Though Derrida does not explicitly state it, as an Algerian Jew, the “sinister
connotations” he refers to are likely a reference to the treatment of Jews and the
logic of anti-Semitism.
Beloved is a text that is saturated with an implicit commitment to biologism—
a commitment to a biological continuum. As shown by Lawler biologism insists that
“species” is an unbreakable chain that can be arranged into a hierarchy. Biologism is
pervasive it is in the text. It would be easy to mistake the dehumanization of African
Americans in the novel as being evidence that there is an absolute rupture between
Man and Animal, with the slave being placed in the Animal side of the binary.
However, as will be seen, the text constantly allows the position of species to
fluctuate, which suggests that there is no absolute division between species, but
rather a hierarchal continuum that allows for species to be ranked, moreover the text
demonstrates rank variations within the same species.
The “sinister connotations” are apparent from the first pages of the novel. It
is evidently clear that there is no species security for African Americans in the novel
because the logic of the narrative is biologism. The novel opens with Paul D reuniting
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with Sethe and discussing what has happened since they last saw each other. Sethe
explains that after her children escaped, she returned to find her husband Halle and
at some point, the nephews of Sweet Home’s overseer, Schoolteacher, raped her and
took the milk from her lactating breast. Telling Paul D that “after I left you, those
boys came in there and took my milk. That’s what they come in there for. Held me
down and took it” (19). Later on in the novel, recalling the event, Sethe says “they
handled her like I was the cow, no, the goat, back behind the stable because I was
too nasty to stay in with the horses. But I wasn’t too nasty to cook their food or take
care of Mrs. Garner” (236-7). This image of Sethe not being “too nasty” to rape
contrasts with the Sweet Home men that “had taken to calves” and “decided to let
her be” (12). The men at Sweet Home are “fucking cows” and “dreaming of rape”
because they are “waiting for the new girl” to choose (13). In other words, the new
girl, Sethe, is not raped even though all the men dream of it. Instead the men
substitute Sethe as the object of their rape fantasies with raping cows. Part of
Morrison’s intention here is to suggest that sex itself is a biological need and
depriving men “in their twenties” of the opportunity for sex is part of the violence
committed against them. It is an exercise in control by the overseer—a forced
chastity14. This is evidenced by describing them as being “sick with the absence of
women” (12-3). The sickness is a psychic sickness—a need that cannot be met
because of the prohibitions placed on them by the overseer. It is an extension of

14

“Violence” here is not meant as physical violence, though that certainly is practiced, but rather the
violence of denying one ownership of one’s own body.
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ownership of their bodies and what they do with those bodies. However, what is
more important here is the fluidity between species that is evidence of biologism.
The substitution of Sethe as the object of rape with cows is not because of
Sethe, but because “they were Sweet Home men” capable of exercising restraint
(12). In other words, it is not because they respected Sethe that they raped cows
instead of her, but rather, it was the result of their not having ownership of their own
bodies. Mr. Garner, the owner of Sweet Home, frequently taunts other farmers by
saying that they “got boys” whereas his “niggers is men every one em” (12). The
results are always predictable:
“Beg to differ, Garner. Ain’t no nigger men.”
“Not if you scared, they ain’t.” Garner’s smile was wide. “But if you a
man yourself, you’ll want your niggers to be men too.”
“I wouldn’t have no nigger men round my wife.”
It was the reaction Garner loved and waited for. “Neither would I,” he
said. “Neither would I,” and there was always a pause before the neighbor, or
stranger, or peddler, or brother-in-law or whoever it was got the meaning.
Then a fierce argument, sometimes a fight, and Garner came home bruised
and pleased, having demonstrated one more time what a real Kentuckian
was: one tough enough and smart enough to make and call his own niggers
men. (12-3)
Essentially, to be a man in Garner’s view requires the recognition of his slaves as men
as well—not as children or animals—and not being threatened that they will rape his
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wife because he has properly conditioned them. The arguments that Garner starts
are the result of his suggestion that the others that refuse to recognize their slaves as
men are not really men themselves. While recognizing the humanness of his slaves
generally makes Garner appear to be less reprehensible than the other slave owners,
it is actually far more insidious. By insisting that his slaves are “men” and that he
made them that way—while still owning them as property—Garner is admitting that
some humans can own other humans15. In other words, while the other slave-owners
are able to justify themselves by not recognizing them as men and therefore placing
them on the other side of the binary where animals reside, Garner’s justification is
simply that some men can be owned by other, superior men. This is one of the
“sinister connotations” of biologism that Derrida alludes to in his discussion of the
asininity of biologism. The same belief allows Garner to appear as kind when he lets
Halle buy his mother, Baby Suggs. The appearance of benevolence is again revealed
to be insidious, as Halle explains to Sethe: “She [Baby Suggs] worked here for ten
years. If she worked another ten you think she would’ve made it out? I pay him for
her last years and in return he got you, me and three more coming up” (231). In
other words, Garner is not letting Baby Suggs have freedom, but rather ensuring that
he keeps his most productive slaves indebted to him. In “From Politics to
Biopolitics…and Back,” Slavoj Zizek points out “showing mercy is the ONLY way for a
Master to demonstrate his supra-legal authority” (504). In addition, by letting Halle
15

There is some slippage between children and animals in this reading. While Garner calls the other
slaves “boys,” this should not be understood as equating with them with white children. Unlike the
white children whose relationship as property ends at a certain age, the slave eternally remains
property and therefore, is more identifiable with animal life.
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buy Baby Suggs, the insidious logic of biologism is further inscribed by forcing Halle to
participate in it. Although recognized as human, African American women are not
human enough to own themselves. Even though Baby Suggs is allowed to leave
Sweet Home and head north, she is still not free in the sense that she does not own
herself. In addition, Baby Suggs can never be free (nor can any African American)
because under the bio-political regime and the logic of biologism her race itself
enables the possibility of ownership—a possibility that does not exist for white men.
Whereas Cary Wolfe asserts “to live under biopolitics is to live in a situation in which
we are all always already (potential) ‘animals’ before the law,” in this case it is a not a
matter of the potential of being animal, but instead it is that there is no abyssal
rupture between human/animal so that any human has the potential to be treated in
the same manner as an animal or worse than some animals (Before the Law, 11).
Human, but not as human as those “that give themselves the right to give” that
designation. In this case it is directly the plantation owner, Garner, that gets to
decide who is human and who is not. On a larger scale, it is white men that give
themselves the right to decide who is human and just how human they are—this is
the highest level of biologism’s hierarchy—those that designate others.
This “right to give” is something that Derrida addresses in The Animal That
Therefore I Am in regards to the term animal:
Yes, animal, what a word! Animal is a word that men have given
themselves the right to give. These humans are found giving it to
themselves, this word, but as if they had received it as an inheritance.
61

They have given themselves the word in order to corral a large
number of living beings within a single concept: “The Animal,” they
say. And they have given it to themselves, this word, at the same time
according themselves, reserving for them, for humans, the right to the
word, the naming noun… (32)
The arrogance of this act—of giving themselves the right to give—is mirrored in
Beloved when Paul D contemplates the difference between Mr. Garner and
Schoolteacher.
Garner called and announced them men—but only on Sweet Home,
and by his leave. Was he naming what he saw or creating what he did
not? That was the wonder of Sixo, and even Halle; it was always clear
to Paul D that those two were men whether Garner said so or not. It
troubled him that, concerning his own manhood, he could not satisfy
himself on that point. Oh, he did manly things, but was that Garner’s
gift or his own will? What would he have been anyway—before Sweet
Home—without Garner? (260)
Therefore, the logic of biologism does not just create the possibility to designate
what is animal, but also what is human and just how human (child/adult,
owned/owner). Paul D’s questioning of his own manhood, his own humanness, is
because he does not have the right to give the name Man to himself. When he asks
himself does “a whiteman saying it make it so?” The answer is yes. The insidiousness
of Garner’s biologism is not that he does not recognize his slaves as men or human,
62

but that he prevents them from recognizing themselves as human. That Paul D does
not possess the “right to give” to himself the status of man, of human, is a far worse
violence than if Garner just did not recognize him as human. Unlike Halle and Sixo
who came to Garner as men, Paul D was sold as a child and therefore does not know
anything except the pacifying logic of Garner’s biologism.
The insidiousness of Garner’s logic is also reflected in Paul D’s hatred for the
rooster named Mister. In recalling his torture by Schoolteacher by forcing him to take
“the bit” he explains that the worst part wasn’t the bit itself, it was “The
rooster…Walking past the roosters looking at them look at me” (85). In particular it
was Mister, whom Paul D had saved from death by helping him hatch, which
antagonized him the most. Paul D tells Sethe that “he [Mister] was hateful all right.
Bloody too, and evil…He sat right there on the tub looking at me. I swear he smiled”
(85). He continues:
Mister, he looked so…free. Better than me. Stronger, tougher. Son of a
bitch couldn’t even get out of the shell hisself but he was still
king…Mister was allowed to be and stay what he was. But I wasn’t
allowed to be and stay what I was. Even if you cooked him you’d be
cooking a rooster named Mister. But wasn’t no way I’d ever be Paul D
again, living or dead. (86)
Paul D’s realization here is that in the logic of biologism there is the possibility of
movement along the hierarchal continuum. Combined with the lack of the “right to
give” to himself the word/name man, or even his name “Paul D,” the impossibility of
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ever truly being a man is exposed. Unlike the named rooster whose position on the
continuum is secure, without the absolute division of human/animal Paul D can never
be certain of where he stands16. The freedom that Mister possesses is not the
freedom to not be owned or brutalized or killed, it is the freedom to be rooster—to
be secure in its species being17.
This biologism emerges from a certain biopolitical regime that operates by
regulating biota. Michel Foucault defines biopolitics in his lectures Society Must be
Defended as “the power to make live. Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we
have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it,
in contrast, consists in making live and letting die” (247). Biopolitics and the
emergence of bio-power occur in the seventeenth and eighteenth century according
to Foucault. Although Foucault, along with Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito,
are largely the philosophers most closely associated with biopolitical thought, Slavoj
Zizek’s work that offers further insight for understanding Beloved because of his work
on resistence. Whereas Foucault, Agamben, and Esposito largely focus on the
relations between power, law and the regulation of bodies in their work, Zizek’s brief
essay, “From Politics to Biopolitics….and Back” articulates an understanding of
resistance in a biopolitical regime that helps to decipher Sethe’s actions.
16

Of course the position of animal species is never certain either depending on the culture. For
example, many American rightfully express outrage at the killing of elephants and rhinos for Chinese
medicine but have no problems lining up to buy celebrity cook Anthony Bourdain’s book Medium Raw
in which he delights in telling the readers about a secret dinner where he and other famous chefs dine
on the endangered Ortolan. The difference for Mister and Paul D is that Mister is secure in the fact
that he will always be a rooster because Mister knows nothing but his roosterhood.
17
The ape narrator that acts like a human to avoid being put in a zoo in Franz Kafka’s “A Report to the
Academy” accounts for this species imitation as a limited freedom opposed to a “freedom on all sides”
that is offered by species security.
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To understand Sethe’s actions Zizek’s discussion of Biopolitics, law, and
democracy is useful. Zizek’s essay works on the notion of the inclusion of exclusion
that Agamben characterizes as the fundamental operation of the state of exception.
Agamben identifies the Sovereign’s ability to declare a state of exception—to
suspend the law—as the force which brings anomie into the grasp of the law. As
Agamben states in his book, Homo Sacer: “I, the sovereign, who am outside the law,
declare that there is nothing outside the law” (17). This same operation, as Zizek
explains, takes place under the name democracy: “Democracy—in the way this term
is used today—concerns, above all, formal legalism: its minimal definition is the
unconditional adherence to a certain set of formal rules which guarantee that
antagonisms are fully absorbed into the agonistic game” (516). Zizek continues,
“while democracy acknowledges the irreducible plurality of interests, ideologies,
narratives, etc., it excludes those who, as we put it, reject the democratic rules of the
game” (517). In other words, democracy too operates by “fully absorbing
antagonisms,” or as Agamben articulated it, the inclusion of the exclusion. These
complex mechanisms for including the exclusion as the center of the law makes
understanding Sethe’s actions possible. In this case, not only does the law apply to
slaves, but there is also no outside the law—nowhere beyond the reach of the law—
hence Sethe’s inability to truly escape.
The totality of the biologism and the impossibility to escape it, because of its
inclusion of the exclusion, is illustrated in the chapter where Sethe attempts to kill
her children. A reference to Revelations, “when the four horsemen came—
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schoolteacher, one nephew, one slave catcher and a sheriff,“ opens the chapter of
Sethe’s transgression—her strike against the law and at the same time, biologism
(174). Unlike the New Testament, Beloved’s revelations do not come at the end,
although they are no less apocalyptic. As Schoolteacher and the others approach the
house, biologism again gets reinforced by the narrative: “Unlike a snake or a bear, a
dead nigger could not be skinned for profit and was not worth his own dead weight
in coin” (174-75). Here again we see Sethe (and other slaves) as being placed on a
continuum that reflects that they see her as human—because her meat, “dead
weight,” is worthless and so is her skin—but somehow she is still not human enough
to be treated as such. Being human alone is not enough to entitle one to certain
treatment. Schoolteacher and the other “horsemen” find Sethe inside where she is
attempting to kill her children.
Inside, two boys bled in the sawdust and dirt at the feet of a nigger
woman holding a blood-soaked child to her chest with one hand and
an infant by the heels in the other. She did not look at them; she
simply swung the baby toward the wall planks, missed and tried to
connect a second time, when out of nowhere—in the ticking time the
men spent staring at what there was to stare at—the old nigger boy,
still mewing, ran through the door behind them and snatched the
baby from the arc of the mother’s swing. (175)
The scene makes it immediately clear “that there was nothing left claim” for
Schoolteacher and the Sweet Home Plantation. Schoolteacher concludes that Sethe’s
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“gone wild, due to the mishandling of the nephew who’d overbeat her and made her
cut and run” (176). However, the novel contradicts Schoolteacher’s assessment of
why Sethe kills, or attempts to kill her children. First, when Stamp Paid reveals to
Paul D that he was present during the event, he tells Paul D that Sethe “ain’t crazy.
She loves those children. She was trying to out-hurt the hurter” (276). And then later
on Sethe explains that whites won’t just “work, kill, and maim you, but dirty you.
Dirty you so bad you couldn’t like yourself anymore” (295). Sethe continues to
explain that though she can no longer recognize or like herself, “the best thing she
was, was her children. Whites might dirty her all right, but not her best thing, her
beautiful, magical best thing—the part of her that was clean…And no one, nobody on
this earth, would list her daughter’s characteristics on the animal side of the paper”
(296). Here Sethe is referring to when she witnessed Schoolteacher having his
nephews make lists of her animal and human features, which was ultimately Sethe’s
impetus to try and escape (228). However, all three of the novel’s explanations are
insufficient. Stamp Paid’s assertion that Sethe was trying to “out-hurt the hurter,”
would require that Schoolteacher values black lives as more than a monetary
investment, which is clearly not the case. In fact, Sethe’s actions only serve to
reinforce Schoolteacher’s belief that her actions are “the results of a little so-called
freedom imposed on people who needed every care and guidance in the world to
keep them from the cannibal life they preferred” (177). As for Sethe’s explanation,
though her children are not forced to return to Sweet Home, it is hard to understand
how they are not made “dirty.” Beloved, of course, is dirtied by filicide—which,
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although committed by Sethe, is the result of the “whites.” Howard and Buglar,
Sethe’s two sons, flee from her the moment they get the chance and Denver is an
emotionally stunted adult that acts like a child. Therefore, in order to provide a
sufficient explanation, Sethe’s actions can be seen to possess an additional political
level that is characterized by Zizek as an impossible act.
Zizek redefines the Lacanian term “act” as “neither a strategic intervention
into the existing order, nor its ‘crazy’ destructive negation; an act is ‘excessive,’ transstrategic, intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order”
(511). In addition, it is “only such an ‘impossible’ gesture of pure expenditure can
change the very coordinates of what is strategically possible within a historical
constellation” (511). Zizek’s example of such an act is the “well-known” (the validity
of the story is questionable as it seems to only be traced to a consultant for the film
Apocalypse Now) act committed by the Vietcong where they chopped off the arms of
children that had been vaccinated by US doctors18. Sethe’s action must be seen in
the same way, as an “impossible gesture”—a radically transgressive act—an anomic
act. Because there is no outside the law, no outside this biopolitical configuration,
escaping to the North is not really an escape. The only possible way to escape is by
action that current configuration cannot possibly understand, an impossible act that
therefore, creates anomie. It is the unaccounted for and unaccountable that disrupts
the biopolitical machine—that creates a momentary stutter and allows for a truly
18

A discussion of the atrocity story by The University of Washington’s Vietnam Studies Group tracked
the origin of the story to Fred Rexer, a member of Special Forces that consulted for the film. Bettina
McNeil, who traced the origin of the story through screenwriter John Milius, also discovered another
one of Rexer’s favorite tales was “ how, as a CIA operative, he had executed Viet Cong chieftans by
squeezing his fingers through their eye-sockets and literally tearing their skulls apart.”
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anomic space. This is reflected in the narrative by the sheriff’s indecision while
arresting Sethe and her rather quick release. The law does not know what to do in
the face of the impossible. Ultimately, Sethe’s transgression displays the law’s true
impotence in a biopolitical regime.
Of course, the sacrifice required for this disruption is so great that is
questionable whether such an impossible act can be liberating at all. However,
Sethe’s unrecognizability afterwards would suggest that there is indeed liberation.
“This here Sethe was new,” Paul D thinks to himself (193). He continues: “This here
Sethe talked about safety with a handsaw. This here new Sethe didn’t know where
the world stopped and she began. Suddenly he saw what Stamp Paid wanted him to
see: more important than what Sethe had done was what she claimed. It scared him”
(193). What Sethe claimed in the literal sense is that her act was an act of love—not
mercy or out of insanity—thick love. When Paul D contests her claim by saying her
love is “too thick,” Sethe responds that “thin love ain’t love at all” (193-94). However,
Sethe’s claim goes beyond the literal, in addition to love, Sethe has claimed her right
to an anomic space, which transforms her into an unrecognizable being. Paul D’s
statement that Sethe “got two feet…not four” is meant to suggest that she
committed an inhuman act, but instead reveals Paul D’s own inability to make sense
of the “new” Sethe. She has two feet—she is human—but her action is impossible to
understand under the current configuration that other humans use to regulate the
world around them. Thus, the “new” Sethe occupies that same anomic space—the
space of the unrecognizable—that animals also occupy. Essentially, Sethe has
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challenged the logic of biologism through her actions by insisting on an absolute
alterity. An abyssal rupture between the recognizable and the unrecognizable—
between human and other. However, Sethe is essentially also unrecognizable to
herself, which suggests that only through figurative and literal death can the
biopolitical regime be challenged.
Contrary to the impossible sacrifice that Sethe makes, Pecola in The Bluest
Eye attempts to challenge biologism not through confrontation with the human
world, but rather by seeking out engagements with the non-human world. Morrison
begins her first novel with a version of a Dick and Jane tale that features animals. The
tale introduces us to a girl named Jane that wants to play and at first attempts to play
with a cat. “See the cat. It goes meow-meow. Come and play. Come and play with
Jane. The kitten will not play.” After being rebuked by the cat, Jane attempts to play
with her parents, but they both ignore her. Next she attempts to play with a dog,
“See the dog. Bowwow goes the dog. Do you want to play with Jane? See the dog
run. Run, dog, run.” Again, Jane is rebuked. Ultimately, the cat and dog will be
mirrored later in the novel, and their unwillingness to fulfill their roles (as pets for the
entertainment of humans) foreshadows their eventual fates.
Just like in the child's tale at the beginning of novel, the cat appears first in
the actual story of the novel. The cat chapter opens with a description of a certain
type of African American girls that “live in quiet black neighborhoods where
everybody is gainfully employed,” where “they are not fretful, nervous, or shrill,” and
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“they do not drink, smoke, or swear and they still call sex ‘nookie’”(82). Eventually
these girls get older and go off to school:
They go to land-grant colleges, normal schools, and learn how to do
the white man’s work with refinement: home economics to prepare
his food; teacher education to instruct black children in obedience;
music to soothe the weary master and entertain his blunted soul. Here
they learn the rest of lesson begun in those soft houses with porch
swings and pots of bleeding heart: how to behave…how to get rid of
the funkiness. The dreadful funkiness of passion, the funkiness of
nature, the funkiness of the wide range of human emotions. (83)
This description crystalizes from a multiplicity of girls to the singular image of the
woman they will all grow up to be, as if there is no possibility for variance or
uniqueness. They will all get married to certain type of man, have a child, likely
named Junior, and cultivate a certain type home. They will resent sex with their
husbands because of their need to suppress their passion, and will never experience
an orgasm. They will all be like Junior’s mother Geraldine, playing a role so
completely that any trace of the actor is completely eliminated. This education is a
traumatic experience. An approximation of the image of whiteness obtained not
through lactification, but through erasure, which leaves these women in a permanent
state of misery19.

19

Lactification is a neologism that Frantz Fanon uses in his book Black Skin, White Mask to describe
the processes of attempting to breed out the blackness. As Fanon states, “Whiten the race, save the
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Interestingly, when the cat is first introduced, although the “girls” have
already become a single “woman,” it is still just a generic woman and not a specific
individual character:
Occasionally some living thing will engage her affections. A cat,
perhaps, who will love her order, precision, and constancy; who will be
as clean and quiet as she is. The cat will settle quietly on the
windowsill and caress her with his eyes. She can hold him in her arms,
letting his back paws struggle for footing on her breast and his
forepaws cling to her shoulder. She can rub the smooth fur and feel
the unresisting flesh underneath. (85)
Although the “living thing” is only “perhaps” a cat, suggesting that there are other
companion species that may engage the affections of these women, the preceeding
description seems to indicate that this other species may not be a dog. A dog would
likely not “be as clean and quiet as she is.” It also seems fair to assume, since the
keeping of exotic species as common household pets is a relatively recent
phenomenon, that only other practical possibility is a bird. A bird is also not likely to
be as “clean and quiet as she is,” therefore, although Morrison leaves open the
possibility that it be some other companion species, in all likelihood it will be a cat.
The individuation of species seems to be a significant inclusive that is often
overlooked because of the underlying foundation of humanism that is present in

race, but not in the sense that one might think: not ‘preserve the uniqueness of that part of the world
in which they grew up,” but make sure that it will be white” (47).
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most analysis. As Cary Wolfe explains in his essay “Human, All Too Human: 'Animal
Studies' and the Humanities,”
The full force of animal studies...resides in its power to remind us that
it is not enough to reread and reinterpret—from a safe ontological
distance, as it were—the relation of metaphor and species difference,
the pollination of speciesist, sexist, and racist discursive structures in
literature, and so on. That undertaking is no doubt praiseworthy and
long overdue, but as long as it leaves unquestioned the humanist
schema of the knowing subject who undertakes such a reading, then it
sustains the humanism and anthropocentrism that animal studies sets
out to question. (569)
Wolfe is suggesting is that the focus of Animal Studies must be on challenging the
discourse of humanism itself, which means that the individual animals must be
accounted for. Humanism operates primarily on a binary opposition between
human/non-human, or, to maintain consistent terminology, human/animal. In other
words, on one side of the equation we have Homo sapiens and on the other side of
the equation we have the entirety of all other species that have existed or will exist.
With the exception of Homo sapiens (or perhaps the genus Homo), all other beings
are reduced to the singular category animal. Therefore, it is essential that any
analysis of this chapter takes into account the fact that it is a cat, and not a dog or
bird, which “will engage her affections.”
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Like the figure of these women, the cat too comes to the encounter with its
own historical baggage. The history of the species of cats has not been a pleasant
one, as detailed in Linda Kalof’s book Looking at Animals in Human History. Although
it is well known that Ancient Egyptians held cats to be the most scared of animals,
going so far as to mummify cats to buried with them, and as Kalof explains “it was
forbidden to kill, a cat, and if one died of natural causes members of the household
would shave their eyebrows” (20). Kalof also retells the legend of Cambyses, a
Persian king, that “was able to conquer Egypt in 525 BC by positioning in front of his
advancing army animals revered by Egyptians…fearing that harm would come to one
of the advancing animals, the Egyptians stopped their defensive strategies and
Cambyses’s victory was won” (20). Unfortunately for felines, this was the height of
their respect in Western civilization, and they soon became one the most abused and
tormented species. In fact, it seems that not even the preserved corpses of cats
could escape Britian’s habit of exportation and exploitation of all things African, by
“the end of the nineteenth century shiploads of cat mummies were sent to England
to be ground into fertilizer” (20).
During the Renaissance, “violence was a part of daily life…endorsed by the
church, and regularly used by more powerful against the less powerful, including the
poor…and , of course, animals” (87). Kalof continues on to explain that “cats were
particularly maligned. The French tortured cats for amusement, and the English
burned them, hunted them with hounds and roasted them on a spit” (87).
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The enthusiastic celebrations which featured the torture of cats continued
well into the eighteenth century as cats increasing became associated with women.
Symbolic of witchcraft, cats were associated with women (the word
‘pussy’ has the same meaning in French slang as it does in English, and
has been an obscenity for hundreds of years), and it was “an easy
jump from the sexuality of women to the cuckolding of men” (Robert
Darnton qtd. in Kalof; 113)
Clearly, the cat itself is important, as is its historicity. Returning to the novel,
Morrison, still focused on the singular but not individuated woman, exclaims that the
“cat will always know that he is first in her affections. Even after she bears a child”
(86). This, yet again, stresses the importance of the interspecies relationship between
these women and cats. Finally, Morrison moves from the singular non-individuated
woman to a specific “one such girl,” named Geraldine. Geraldine is identical to the
previously described girls that have grown into one of these women that has
suppressed all the “funkiness of human emotion,” married, moved to Ohio and had a
child.
Geraldine did not allow her baby, Junior, to cry…[She]did not talk to
him, coo to him, or indulge him in kissing bouts, but she saw that
every other desire was fulfilled. It was not long before the child
discovered the difference in his mother’s behavior to himself and the
cat. As he grew older, he learned to direct his hatred of his mother to
the cat, and spent some happy moments watching it suffer. (86)
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In addition to her lack of emotional connection to Junior, she also “did not like him to
play with niggers” (87), explaining that “colored people were neat and quiet; niggers
were dirty and loud.” Geraldine despite all her discipline understood that the “line
between colored and nigger was not always clear; subtle and telltale signs
threatened to erode it, and the watch had to be constant” (87). It is easy to
understand the distance and detachment Geraldine has towards Junior, after all, he
was borne out of duty not passion or desire and his presence, unless constantly
controlled, risked slipping back into that “funkiness” that she has tried so desperately
to erase. It is equally easy to understand Junior’s hatred of the cat, who he sees as a
competitor for his mother’s affection—a competitor he cannot defeat. It is more
difficult to understand the relationship between the cat and Geraldine, and later on,
the cat and Pecola.
One of the difficulties inherent in Animal Studies is the risk of erasing alterity
and speaking in the place of the other, which in this case is the cat. We must remind
ourselves that we are not ventriloquist and animals are not dummies, we cannot
speak for them. However, at the same time, being conscious of this difficulty has
often lead to analysis that acknowledges the presence of the other, but does not
engage it. The presence of the other is talked about and talked around, but never
invited to participate. Therefore, before proceeding, an analytical model that takes
into account these difficulties must be established.
Donna Haraway, in her book When Species Meet, acknowledges the
important progress that Jacques Derrida made in his lectures “And Say the Animal
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Responded?” and “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” when he
acknowledged that “actual animals look back at actual human beings.” Haraway
praises Derrida for identifying “the key question as not being not whether the cat
could ‘speak’ but whether it is possible to know what responds means and how to
distinguish a response from a reaction” (20). However, despite Derrida’s
accomplishment, Haraway correctly chastises him for failing to “seriously consider an
alternative form of engagement…how to look back” (20). She continues, “Derrida
failed a simple obligation of companion species; he did not become curious about
what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to
him in looking back at him that morning” (20). Ultimately for Haraway, Derrida was
unable, or unwilling, to transgress the anthropocentric tradition that has so firmly
been established in Western Philosophy, and what began with a promising
engagement with another species resulted in an exercise in narcissism that left
Derrida knowing nothing more about the cat that when he started.
In order to avoid the mistake of Derrida, the unwillingness or inability to
engage his cat, Haraway suggests that it is vital to consider the possibilities of “otherworldings,” by engaging in responsive relationships. While Haraway is speaking of
real world encounters with animals, particularly the experiences of Barbara Smuts
while she was studying baboons for her PhD20, the same principles can be used in a
model for literary analysis. Haraway continues:

20

As related by Haraway, Barbara Smuts, while attempting to earn a Ph.D., starts to study Baboons in
Kenya. She is originally advised to study them by the traditional anthropologist strategy of attempting
to become invisible to the baboons. Of course, it never works, because she is not actually invisible, nor
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All actors become who they are in the dance of relating, not from
scratch, not from ex nihilo, but full of the patterns of their sometimesjoined, sometimes-separate heritages both before and lateral this
encounter. All the dancers are redone through the patterns they
enact. The temporalities of companion species comprehend all the
possibilities activated in becoming with, including the heterogeneous
scales of evolutionary time for everybody but also the many others
rhythms of conjoined process. (25)
Therefore, in order to develop an analytic model for analysis of the cat and dog in
The Bluest Eye while avoiding the difficulties inherent in Animal Studies, the focus
should not be on the individual actors, human or non-human, but rather, on the
space between, the contact zones—the “dance of relations”—while acknowledging
the historicity of each participant.
Returning to the novel, as previously mentioned, a cat is first introduced while
Morrison is still describing the singular but not yet individuated woman, as the only
living thing that can “engage her affections.” Again, when considering the question
of why it is always and only a cat that is capable of engaging these women, their
historical positions must be considered. From the history provided by Linda Kalof, it is
easy to see the similarities—the history of abuse and cruelty, which came primarily at

are the baboons blind, deaf, and without smell. So she had to learn the rituals of greetings and the
dance of relations in order to actually study the baboons. As Haraway says, “If she really wanted to
study something other than how human beings are in the way, if she was really interested in these
baboons, Smuts had to enter into, not shun, a responsive relationship” (25).
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the hands of European men; the need to tame their wildness—to learn to erase the
“funkiness” of their existence.
The description of their dance of relations becomes increasingly sensual, with
the cat finding “footing on her breast” as she rubs “the smooth fur and feel[s] the
unresisting flesh underneath.” The woman delights in the “strangely pleasant
sensation that comes when he [the cat] writhes beneath her hand and flattens his
eyes with surfeit of sensual delight.” And, while cooking, “her fingers tremble” when
he “circle[s] about her shanks, and the trill of his fur spirals up her legs to her thighs.”
While sitting with the cat in her lap she “fondle[s] that soft hill of hair and let[s] the
warmth of the animal’s body seep over and into the deeply private areas of her
lap…she opens her legs just a little, and the two of them will still be
together…sleeping a little together” (85-86). This sensual language should not be
read as sexual desire. It is not a subtle allusion to bestiality; it is a description of a
responsive relationship with each responding to the touch of the other. The cat
responds to the woman’s touch by preening and stretching out, while the woman
responds by opening her legs when the cat jumps on her lap. It is an act of
engagement that mutually benefits each being—it is the “funkiness” of emotions.
This responsive relationship contrast the previous description of these women’s
sexual relationship with their husband, where she “stiffens when she feels one her
paper curlers coming undone from the activity” and hopes that “she will remain dry
between her legs,” because she hates the “glucking sound they make when she is
moist”(84). It is reasonable to assume that the wishing to remain dry is also a desire
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to prevent an unintended physiological response, which would signal engagement. It
is not the sex she despises; it is the very act of relating. Geraldine (and the women
like her) spends so much effort on erasure that she cannot risk engaging in a
responsive relationship with another person because it risks an eruption of the
“funkiness of human emotion.” Therefore, the cat allows Geraldine to enter into a
symbiotic relationship of mutual affection and exclusion while still maintaining the
suppression of the funkiness. This responsive relationship with the cat is the main
thing that separates Geraldine from Pecola.
Pecola and Geraldine’s cat are introduced to each other in a less than ideal
manner. As Pecola follows Junior around the house he suddenly surprises her by
throwing the cat into her face. Of course, not only is Pecola shocked and potentially
injured, but the cat, too, is in a similar situation. Junior proceeds to lock them in the
room together:
The tears came fast, and she held her face in her hands. When
something soft and furry moved around her ankles, she jumped, and
saw it was the cat. He wound himself in and about her legs.
Momentarily distracted from her fear, she squatted down to touch
him, her hands wet from the tears. The cat rubbed up against her
knee. He was black all over, deep silky black, and his eyes, pointing
down toward his nose, were bluish green. The light made them shine
like blue ice. Pecola rubbed the cat's head; he whined, his tongue
flicking with pleasure. The blue eyes in the black face held her. (90)
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It is not the presence of the cat that calms Pecola down, nor is it simply Pecola's
presence that causes the cat to show affection towards her, it is the dance between
them that influences their behavior. The cat makes the initial move to interact by
winding himself through her legs, however, it is also Pecola's reaction, bending down
to gently rub the cats head that fulfills the dance. The communication between the
species is dependent on this dance, and it is this communication that allows the
species the ability to become-with, to enter into a responsive relationship. This dance
is a complex ritual of greetings, and it is these rituals of greetings, and correctly
performed greetings, that develop the actors, human and non-human. Pecola,
through this complex ritual of greeting, receives an affection that she has not
previously known. The cat and Percola communicate a shared experience of torture
at the hands of others. It causes Pecola to feel, for once, not hated for her looks.
Pecola’s character develops, evolves, becomes-with the cat. Of course, had Pecola
performed the ritual of greetings, the “dance of relations,” differently, the results
would be different. If Pecola had tried to snatch the cat up and squeeze it to her
chest, the cat would likely react very differently, perhaps even scratching her.
Therefore, in order for Pecola to become-with the cat, to enter into the responsive
relationship, she must perform the proper rituals, if she does not, then she risks the
possibility of denying the alterity of the other and not developing herself. It is also
significant to note that this development of Pecola's character through the
interspecies interaction is abruptly disrupted when Junior enters the room and
proceeds to kill the cat and blame it on Pecola. This is one of the significant turning
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points in the development of Pecola, coming at the end of the winter section novel,
almost directly in the center of the book; Pecola’s possibilities of developing into a
healthy adult are suddenly shattered.
The contrast between Pecola and Geraldine seems to suggest that animals are
fundamental in the development of those that have been marginalized or otherwise
mistreated in a human society—a connection that has gained increasing attention
from sociologists like Clifton P. Flynn over the past decade.21 Of course, the cat is not
the only significant animal character in the story that Pecola encounters, there is also
the old dog.
The dog does not appear until the second to last chapter in the novel. This
chapter comes directly after the description of Pecola’s rape by Cholly. The chapter
begins by introducing us to Geraldine’s counterpart, an educated West Indian called
Soaphead Church. Much like Geraldine (and the girls like her), Soaphead’s ancestors
were obsessed with erasing “in body, mind, and spirit…all that suggested Africa”
(167). This is largely accomplished by marrying whites and “lightening the family
complexion and thinning out the family features” (168). However, over time it
became difficult to “maintain their whiteness” as some relatives married each other.
Soaphead is the grandchild of one of these unions and his father raises him as a
subject to test his educational and disciplinary theories. Again, like Geraldine, he is
21

Flynn’s articles “Battered Women and Their Animal Companions: Symbolic Interaction Between
Human and Nonhuman Animals” and “Woman’s Best Friend: Pet Abuse in the Lives of Battered
Women,” document the importance that pets play in the lives of battered women. In addition, Flynn
finds that many of the abusers also abuse the pets, sometimes killing them (like Junior in The Bluest
Eye) in order to cause emotional and psychological harm to their human victims. Amazingly, many
women reported avoid seeking help or leaving their abusers because they feared for the safety of
their companion pets.
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obsessed with cleanliness and order, and sees sexual relation as something dirty and
disgusting. He is a pedophile that sees his molesting of little girls “smack[s] of
innocence and was associated in his mind with cleanliness” (166-7). After moving to
Lorain he rents a room in an old woman’s house and becomes a “Spiritualist and
Psychic Reader” (173). He is content with life with the exception of land lady’s “old
dog, Bob, who, although as deaf and quiet as she [the land lady], was not as clean”
(173). Soaphead wishes that Bob “would hurry up and die” because he is “too old to
be of any use.” Of course, Soaphead believes his “wish for the dog’s death as
humane, for he could not bear…to see anything suffer” (171). If then, Geraldine and
Soaphead are counterparts—two examples of what a history of attempting to
become white, one through lacitification and one through erasure—then the
difference in the interspecies relationships need to be accounted for.
Perhaps the most obvious distinction between Bob and the cat is, of course,
the fact that Bob is not a cat, and therefore, has a different historicity. Dogs, though
still abused and tortured frequently, fare much better in human history. In the
Middle Ages dogs are primarily used for hunting and to protect property. However,
as Linda Kalof points out, “the law on hunting prohibited the ownership of hunting
dogs by those below a certain status level, and thus the status of dogs was clearly
determined by the status of their owners” (55). In addition to hunting dogs, mastiffs
were popular with land owners. Kalof explains “intensely loyal and roaming only his
master’s land, the mastiff was more useful as a protector of the people and private
property than a village constable” and was trained to “be capable of killing a man in
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defense of a master” (55-56). During the Renaissance dogs were also “substantial
entertainment value…serving as the main protagonist in animal-baiting exhibitions”
(88). However, as pet ownership became more prevalent among all classes,
authorities in England tried on numerous occasions to institute a dog tax to prevent
the poor from owning dogs, but ultimately failed (118). Kalof continues, “finally,
when rabies became a major concern in the late 1700s, the tax was passed in 1796 as
a means of controlling the disease, primarily by eliminating the dogs of the poor
because they were not as likely as gentlemen’s dogs to be confined if they showed
symptoms of the disease” (118). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the
treatment of service dogs and the use of dogs in vivisection lead to a burgeoning
animal rights movement (anti-vivisection) that coincided with women’s rights and
labor rights movement. The Brown Dog Riots of 1907, the result of anti-vivisectionist
erecting a drinking fountain in memory of a brown dog that endured months of
vivisection, featured “medical students organized riots and disturbances at women’s
suffrage meetings and antivivisection meetings,” and lasted for three years.
Eventually, the organized riots ceased when the fountain was stolen by “four council
workmen guarded by 120 police and eventually broken up in a Battersea Council
yard” (140). Ultimately, as Coral Lansbury points out, “the cause of animals was not
helped when they were seen as surrogates for women or workers…If we look at
animals and see only the reflection of ourselves, we deny them the reality of their
own existence” (qtd. in Kalof, 140). Lansbury’s statement has a double meaning.
First, the association of animal rights by the elites in power with the people that they
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are actively trying to oppress (labor, women), forces them to automatically stand
against animal rights. It does not matter they agree that dogs should be treated
better (no doubt, their own dogs likely were), it only matters that those trying to
disrupt the hierarchy are pushing for animal rights. Second, by labor and women’s
rights movement explicitly associating their treatment to the treatment of animals,
instead of treating them as separate issues, prevented any possible success. So then,
the western history of dogs is one where the species rose to a height in human
society beyond any other (an argument could be made for horses, but they were
never invited to share their master’s homes) and dramatically tumbled back down
the social ladder.
Returning to the novel, the first immediate connection that can be drawn
between Soaphead’s desire to kill Bob and Bob’s historicity is the aspect of utility.
Dogs’ value and their ascendance to privilege (compared to other animals) was
largely a result of their utility. Hunting dogs helped catch game; mastiffs protected
their masters and their masters’ land, and both provided companionship. In this
sense, Soaphead’s desire to kill Bob because he was “too old to be of any use,” can
be read literally, in other words, a dog’s life is only valuable while it can provide
humans some utility. However, this does not seem to be a sufficient analysis of
Soaphead’s hatred of Bob.
Soaphead despises Bob because he fears him. When he finally decides to
poison Bob, “the horror of having to go near him” prevents him from being able to
carry out the act (171). The horror that is cause by the unclean dog is similar to
85

Geraldine’s revulsion to “niggers [who] were dirty and loud” (87). Geraldine’s fear
that the “line between colored and nigger was not always clear,” and unless she was
constantly vigilant, it could be eroded. The same type of fear is what causes
Soaphead to despise Bob. The historicity of Bob as a dog is reminder of the possibility
of slipping back. Dogs, through careful and deliberate breeding, eventually find their
way into the home elite, but now, they are no better than a housecat. Soaphead’s
family has a similar history22. Bob, “mangy” with “his exhausted eyes” that “ran with
sea-green matter around which gnats and flies clustered,” is a constant reminder to
Soaphead, that no matter how white his bloodline, or how well educated he was, in
the white world the binary is white/Other—Bob and Soaphead are both on the side
of Other—and that is where Soaphead’s true revulsion lies. Unlike Geraldine (or the
women like her), Soaphead does not interact with Bob, there is no “contact zone” or
“dance of relating,” and therefore, no chance for a responsive relationship. Pecola,
on the other hand, does come into contact with Bob and is ultimately responsible for
his death.
Pecola comes to Soaphead after Cholly rapes and impregnates her, explaining
that she “can’t go to school no more” and hoping that he can help her by making her
eyes blue (174). Soaphead responds, “I can do nothing for you, my child. I am not a
magician. I work only through the Lord…If he wants your wish granted, He will do it”
(175). He continues to explain that they “must make…some offering, that is, some
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Again, Frantz Fanon provides similar insight in Black Skin, White Mask, stating that “It is always
essential to avoid falling back into the pit of niggerhood, and every woman in the Antilles, whether in a
casual flirtation or in a serious affair, is determined to select the least black of men” (47).
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contact with nature” (177). Of course, unable to actually confront Bob, but wishing to
“hang on to the feeling of power,” he realizes that he has the perfect opportunity to
get finally kill Bob by manipulating Pecola. “Take this food and give it to the creature
sleeping on the porch. Make sure he eats it. And mark well how he behaves. If
nothing happens, you will know that God has refused you. If the animal behaves
strangely, your wish will be granted on the day following this one” (175). Pecola, of
course, does not know that the food is poisoned and approaches Bob with
compassion and kindness, unaware of the harm she is about to inflict.
She reached out and touched the dog’s head, stroking him gently. She
placed the meat on the floor of the porch, near his nose. The odor
roused him; he lifted his head, and got up to smell it better. He ate it
in three or four gulps. The girl stroked his head again, and the dog
looked up at her with soft triangle eyes…The dog gagged…Choking,
stumbling, he moved like a broken toy around the yard. The girl’s
mouth was open, a little petal of tongue showing. She made a wild,
pointless gesture with one hand and then covered her mouth with
both hands. The dog fell again…Then he was quiet. The girl’s hands
covering her mouth, she backed away a few feet, then turned, ran out
of the yard and down the walk. (176)
This is the last image of a sane Pecola in the novel: her hands clasped over her mouth
in horror of what she has done, running out of the house. The following chapter
features Pecola staring into a mirror, looking at her “blue eyes” and talking to an
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imaginary friend. With Bob, like the cat, Pecola enters a responsive relationship of
mutual engagement. She touches his head and Bob responds by opening his eyes and
engaging her. Her continued stroking of his head leads Bob to respond with trust,
taking the food she has set out for him.
Pecola’s interaction with these animals (the cat and Bob) is central to her
development as a character. The death of the cat, the only being that has willfully,
without provocation, shown affection towards Pecola was killed because of it. And
Pecola unknowingly sacrifices Bob as an offering to God. Therefore, the only two
beings that have been receptive to Pecola, that have her responded to her and
recognized her being, are dead as a result23. Bob’s death at her hands eliminates any
possibility of Pecola engaging with another being, which is essential to her
development into a healthy adult. When Bob “looked up at her with soft triangle
eyes,” it was the last time her being would be recognized and acknowledged—
essentially, her very humanness is lost with the death of the cat and Bob.
As for Soaphead, having effectively dispatched of Bob, he writes a letter to
God in which he declares, “I have caused a miracle…Now you [God] are jealous. You
are jealous of me” (182). Essentially, with Bob gone, Soaphead no longer had to be
reminded of his status in a white society, and now sees himself as better than God
because he has done what God could not do “looked at the ugly little black girl,
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One cannot help but to draw a comparison to Emmanuel Levinas’s essay “The Name of a Dog, or
Natural Rights,” in which he recalls a dog named, coincidentally enough, Bobby, that befriends him
while he is prisoner in a Nazi concentration camp. Levinas declares that Bobby is the “Last Kantian in
Nazi Germany,” because Bobby, unlike the Nazis, recognizes that the Jews are humans—he recognizes
their essential being.
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and…loved her” (182). Finally, satisfied with his work, he slips “into an ivory sleep,”
with ivory symbolizing his imagined return to whiteness.
Although Soaphead imagines that he himself is the only one capable of
looking “at the ugly little black girl” and loving her, it only true as a narcissistic
delusion. The only characters that looked at Pecola and saw her not as ugly, or black,
or shameful were Bob and the cat. The significance of this inclusion in Morrison’s first
novel cannot be overstated; especially since it is not a one-time occurrence in a single
novel, but a frequent and deliberate inclusion throughout her entire oeuvre.
Morrison is doing more than simply using animals to demonstrate the oppression of
African Americans or to demonstrate how power performs. Nor does Morrison’s
work, as Tadd Ruetenik suggests in his analysis of Beloved, contain a “limited
speciesism, which can be described as the recognition that human exploitation of
animals is an evil, coupled with a recognition that the amelioration of this evil should
come only after dealing with the equivalent evil of human exploitation of other
humans” (325)24. Instead, as Karla Armbuster points out, Morrison “recognizes that
the same destructive ideology of dualism and hierarchy undergrid racism, sexism,
and the human domination and mistreatment of animals” (370). In other words,
Morrison’s inclusion of animals does not suggest that their suffering or lives are less
important than humans; instead, it suggests that the very ideology that allows for the
possibility of “evil of human exploitation of other humans” derives from humanist
traditions. The binary distinction that allows for an irreducible multiplicity to be
24

Ruetenik, Tadd. “Animal Liberation or Human Redemption: Speciesism and Racism in Toni
Morrison’s Beloved.” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 17:2 (2010).
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reduced to the single category of Other, is the cause of all suffering from
exploitation, whether it be human or animal suffering.
With that said, where Armbuster ultimately fails is in her insistence that the
power of Morrison’s work lies in a call back to “ancient wisdom” and
“communication of with nonhuman animals and the natural world as a whole” (377).
There is no doubt that responsive relationships are central to Morrison’s vision coevolution, or becoming-with, as Haraway would put it, but the romanticizing of the
past embedded in visions of an “ancient wisdom” from a mystical “Edenic state
before language or dualism when humans could converse with animals,” is
problematic and not terribly useful for ending human or animal exploitation. Beside
the inherent problem of practical applicability, as if it was possible to suddenly
renounce civilized society, there is also the problem that the imaginary time when
humans and all other beings in nature were in harmony never really existed. Also,
this vision only serves to reduce the binary human/animal to a singularity, which still
serves to deny alterity by reducing an irreducible multiplicity of beings and ultimately
leads to biologism.Even if we are speaking of a Christian biblical history, and not a
factual human history, the very appearance of Adam creates the binary of
human/animal. In Genesis 1.24-25, God creates all the non-human animals, and then
in the following verse he creates Adam: “Let us make man in our image, after our
likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of
the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that
creepeth upon the earth” (1.26). So then, by the very creation of Adam, who is given
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dominion over all other species, the Human/everything else (animal) binary is
created. In fact, a verse later, God explicitly instructs Adam and Eve to “subdue it [the
Earth]: and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and
over every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (1.28). There is simply no time
when humans and all other animals existed in harmony, and to romanticize a past
where this is true ignores real suffering and exploitation in addition to demeaning the
progress humans and non-human animals have made in learning to enter mutually
beneficial responsive relationships. It denies evolutionary adaptation and progress,
which in turn, denies the possibility of it ever happening.
More humans have more intimate contact with animals (primarily through
pets) than at any other point in history. Therefore, there are also more opportunities
for engagement and developing responsive relationships. Morrison’s work
acknowledges this fact, which is why the animals that appear in her novels are
primarily ones that have integrated (whether by choice or force) into human society.
There are no lions, no elephants, and no komodo dragons—instead we are presented
with dogs, like Bob and Here Boy, cats, cattle, horses and birds—animals that are
available for engagement, if we take the opportunity to respond. In addition,
sustained and meaningful engagement and the co-constitutive possibilities that such
interaction presents, are in and of themselves, the impossible action required to
disrupt the regime of biologism. Real interaction and genuine curiosity about
individuals and species insists on an abyssal rupture between humans and animals. In
addition, this type of engagement with the specific (individual, species, historical
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moment) does not allow for the abyssal rupture to be a single indivisible line
between human and animal, instead, like Derrida says of his own work, it increases
“its figures, in complicating, thickening, delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line
precisely by making it increase and multiply” (29). Every interspecies interaction
then, through acknowledgement of specificity, seeks to increase the contours of
these ruptures so that it is no longer just human/animal, but instead it is this human
and this animal, with all our uniqueness and historicity. This creates infinite
encounters with difference and therefore, opens wide the co-constitutive
possibilities of interspecies interactions.
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CHAPTER 4

A Boy and his Dog and A Man and His Sheep: Imagining Animal Companions After the
End of the World.

At the end of Cormac McCarthy’s post-apocalyptic novel, The Road, the
unnamed boy leaves his dead father’s body to join up with a man and woman. The
man is described as: “dressed in a gray and yellow ski parka. He carried a shotgun
upside down over his shoulder on a braided leather lanyard and he wore a nylon
bandolier filled with shells for the gun. A veteran of old skirmishes, bearded, scarred
across his cheek and the bone stoven and the one eye wandering. When he spoke his
mouth worked imperfectly and when he smiled” (281-82). This description of the
man is not reassuring for the reader and the boy’s fate is ultimately left ambiguous.
The film adaptation of the novel however, modifies this ending to remove the
ambiguity. Although the man (Guy Pearce) appears just as ragged, when the camera
pans across his traveling companions, it slowly pans down to reveal that one of the
companions is a dog—a dog that bears remarkable resemblance to fellow postapocalyptic warrior, Mad Max’s dog companion. This inclusion of the dog in the film
is a reassurance to the viewer that the boy will be okay. If the man keeps a dog alive
at a time where others have turned to cannibalism, then he must be a “good guy”
and therefore the boy is safe. As previously mentioned, the dog at the end of The
Road bears a resemblance to Mad Max’s dog companion that gets killed by bandits
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and sets him on his path of revenge. A similar dog, named Dogmeat, accompanies
your character in the post-apocalyptic video games series Fallout. In addition, in the
novel I Am Legend, it is the arrival of a dog that prevents the protagonist, Robert
Neville, from committing suicide, and in the Terminator series it is dogs that can
distinguish between humans and robots. There are, of course, many more examples
of dogs (not to mention other animals) in post-apocalyptic narratives—and even their
absence, as in The Road, represents a significant aspect of the text. Even when
animals do not directly appear in the narrative, their absence is often still noticed.
With that said, however, even in the Animal Studies fields or Apocalyptic Literature
Studies, animals seem rarely to be a focus of critical attention.25 A closer inspection
of the narratives reveals an interesting split between visions of what comes after the
end of the world—on the one side is the liberal humanist future, and on the other is
a posthumanist future—ultimately revealing that the only hope for redemption is
through cultivating encounters with animal others.
As previously mentioned, animals abound in post-apocalyptic narratives;
however, four texts in particular illustrate the tension between liberal humanists and
posthumanists futures. These texts are Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road; Paolo
Bacigalupi’s short story, “The People of Sand and Slag;” Harlan Ellison’s “A Boy and
His Dog;” and finally, Philip K. Dick’s well-known novel, Do Androids Dream of Electric
Sheep.
25

The only exception seems to be when animals are the direct cause of the apocalypse, like in The
Planet of Apes series. However, even then the animals (chimps) are not the real focus nor are they the
cause of the apocalypse. It is human hubris coupled with a lack of scientific ethics that causes the
apocalypse. In any case, the apocalypse is a strictly anthropocentric event.
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Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, a recipient of the Pulitzer Prize, and John
Hillcoat’s 2009 film adaptation are generally regarded as works about a coming ecoapocalypse. The notoriously private McCarthy in his only televised interview ever,
explained to Oprah that the novel was inspired by his 8-year-old son and imagining
what the world would be like a half century from now. The narrative follows an
unnamed man and his son as they embark on journey towards the coast after an
undescribed apocalyptic event. Hannah Stark in her article “’All these things he saw
and did not see’: Witnessing the End of the World in Cormac McCarthy's The Road,
points out that “it matters little what the precise event is; what is significant to us is
that the world that is described to us is a world without either an ecosystem or
natural resources” (73). McCarthy describes this world as “barren, silent, godless”
where there is “nothing living anywhere” (4, 30). The trees and plants are dead, the
animals are dead—all biota, dead—even the sun and moon are essentially dead.
McCarthy describes the “dark of the invisible moon. The nights now only slightly less
black. By day the banished sun circles the earth like a grieving mother with a lamp”
(32). The world of McCarthy’s novel is not a world that is dying; it is a world that is
already dead. Yet humans, as always, conspicuously remain.
The novel’s portrayal of a world that is already dead, not dying, is indicative of
a liberal humanist apocalypse. As Hannah Stark precisely articulates, “The Road offers
an anthropocentric vision of the end of the world in which humans are the final
witnesses, and also in which the end of the human is also the end of the world” (80).
In addition, though the novel does not reveal the cause of the catastrophe, the status
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as eco-literature during the Anthropocene more than suggests that humans are also
the primary cause of the apocalypse. This is significant because it reveals an
important distinction of what the apocalypse exactly is, and for the liberal humanist
narrative, the apocalypse is the end of human life. Without humans, there is no
planet. For example, there is the often quoted passage in the novel where the man
realizes that to the boy he must be an “alien. A being from a planet that no longer
existed” (153). This passage is generally taken as an indication of the boy’s lack of a
historical past—however, what precedes this quote is more important:
When he woke again he thought the rain had stopped. But that wasnt
[sic] what woke him. He’d been visited in a dream by creatures of a
kind he’d never seen before. They did not speak. He thought that
they’d been crouching by the side of his cot as he slept and then had
skulked away on his awakening. (153)
This is what sparks the man’s realization that to the boy, he possesses alien qualities.
However, although he “could not construct for the child’s pleasure the world he’d
lost without constructing the loss as well,” he nevertheless is a knowable remnant of
that world for the boy. On the other hand, the “dream creatures” are essentially
unknowable. The passage continues:
He tried to remember the dream but he could not. All that was left
was the feeling of it. He thought that perhaps they’d come to warn
him. Of what? That he could not enkindle in the heart of the child
what was ashes in his own. Even now some part of him wished they’d
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never found this refuge. Some part of him always wished it to be over.
(154)
In other words, while the memories of the knowable world of the past (preapocalypse) cannot be passed on to the child, the future itself—one where humans
cease to exist—is equally unknowable for the man. The dream creatures are
therefore, the creatures of unknowable future. The man knows that humans will not
be there to witness what, if anything, comes after the death of the last human and
without the human to witness it, it does not exist. His desire for it “to be over” is the
desire to escape witnessing the unknowable of a dead planet where humans have no
conceivable centrality—no way of structuring the known (and dying) present around
the figure of the human itself.
Here again, is where the discrepancy of the dog in the film and novel remains
significant. Whereas the dog’s inclusion at the end of film reassures the viewer of the
anthropocentric world reemerging—where humans once again reassume their
“natural” roll of having dominion over all other life—the novel’s erasure of the dog
leaves no role for the human. Therefore in the liberal humanist framework, when
there is nothing left to have dominion over, the figure of the human loses all
significance.
The diminishing significance of the human is revealed in the following
passage:
The dog that he [the boy] remembers followed us for two days. I tried
to coax it to come but it would not. I made a noose of wire to catch it.
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There were three cartridges in the pistol. None to spare. She walked
away down the road. The boy looked after her and then he looked at
me and then he looked at the dog and he began to cry and to beg for
the dog’s life and I promised I would not hurt the dog. A trellis of a dog
with the hide stretched over it. The next day it was gone. That is the
dog he remembers. He doesnt [sic] remember any little boys. (87)
This passage stands out for a number of reasons. First, it is the only passage entirely
narrated in first person. Second, as the narrator says, the pistol has “three cartridges”
left in it, which suggests that this scene takes place while the mother is still alive.
Earlier in the text the mother exclaims “I should have done it [killed all of them] a
long time ago. When there were three bullets in the gun instead of two [emphasis
added]” (56). The mother eventually leaves in the middle of the night and commits
suicide. The scene concludes: “In the morning the boy said nothing at all and when
they were packed and ready to set out upon the road he turned and looked back at
their campsite and he said: She’s gone isn’t she? And he said: Yes, she is” (58).
Therefore, reading these passages together, the “she” in the first person passage
takes on a new meaning—it is not the dog that the “she” refers to, but the mother26.
The boy is watching the mother walk away, knowing that she will eventually abandon
them, and then pleads for the dog’s life. The boy is not pleading for the dog’s life as a
replacement for his mother, but rather as another life that can persist in a dead
26

Although this is debatable, the fact that the boy “looked after her and then looked at me and then
looked at the dog” suggests that there are three beings that the boy looks at—the mother, the father,
and the dog. In addition, since the gun is largely to save them if they are caught by cannibals or rapists
by killing themselves first, the mention that with only three bullets there are “none to spare,” means
that it would take three bullets to kill them.
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world. If his mother must die, the dog must live.27 However, the father’s agreement
to not hurt the dog is not a result of the boy’s plea alone; instead it is largely because
the dog is a “trellis of a dog with hide stretched over it.” In other words, the dog has
little utility for the man since it cannot provide them with much food. The dog is
nothing more than a resource for the father, as is the rest of the planet. When all
resources cease to exists, human purpose also ceases to exist. The diminishing
significance of the human in the world is further reflected in the man’s admission
that the boy “doesn’t remember any little boys,” and thus acknowledging that unlike
the dog that the boy is actually remembering from the past, the little boy must have
actually been there since the boy has no reference point.28 Thus the novel’s use of
the first person here calls attention to the significance of the father’s decision. He
knew there was a little boy there, but they did not look for him to see if he needed
help, the father just left him. Marking this by making the father’s recollection of the
event as the only first person passage in the novel demonstrates the significance that
it plays. The father’s abandonment of the little boy effectively shatters the façade of
liberal humanist ideology—that there are humans and there are animals, divided by a
single line of demarcation, which cannot be traversed. Here, the little boy fares no

27

This is what John Steinbeck refers to in his novel, Travels with Charley: In Search of America, as the
“conspiracy of life,” to united against “unlife” in order to persist, to survive.
28
This is seemingly confirmed at the end of novel: “Do you remember that little boy, Papa? Yes. I
remember him. (280).” This passage serves a dual purpose, to acknowledge the little boy they left
behind and, since the father is dying, to mark the boy’s forced transition out of boyhood.
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better than the dog they earlier encountered, and indeed humans in and of
themselves no longer have any significance. 29
Whereas The Road maintains liberal humanism is revealed through the linking
of the diminishing significance of the human to the literal death of all other known
life and therefore suggesting that without humans there is no planet (at least not one
that matters), Paolo Bacigalupi’s 2005 novelette, “The People of Sand and Slag,”
pushes liberal humanism to its logical conclusion—a world where humans are
essentially the only form of life.
“The People of Sand and Slag” envisions what would happen if humans were
truly removed from their connection to other life by both eliminating the
dependency on other life as a necessary resource for humans—in terms of a source
of food, oxygen, et cetera—and by eliminating what Jacques Derrida and (later) Cary
Wolfe refer to as shared finitude (vulnerability).
The novelette takes place in Montana in an unspecified year in the distant
future and follows three security guards, self-described as a “tribe of killers,” that
work for a mining conglomerate named SesCo. The security guards, Chen, Jaak, and
Lisa, spend most of their time following the same routine: “drop nukes on intruders,
slag the leftovers to melt so they couldn’t regrow, hit the beaches for vacation.” They
eat “sand for dinner” and bowls “of tailings mud.” The world has largely been turned
into a toxic waste site as every last resource is extracted. The main protagonist, Chen,
29

This is further reinforced in the novel by the way humans are routinely treated as nothing more than
resources. For instance, cannibals keep prisoners alive in their house while slowly amputating their
limbs to eat and the famous dead baby scene that was cut from the film, where they find a “charred
human infant headless and gutted and blackening on the spit” that they come across in the woods
(110, 198).
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describes, “the mining robots rumbled back and forth, ripping deeper into the earth,
turning into a mush of tailings and rock acid that they left in exposed ponds when
they hit the water table, or piled into thousand-foot mountainscapes of waste soil.”
All that seemingly matters is pleasure and profit. The story starts with an alert that
there is an intruder on SesCo’s mine. The security guards head out to confront and
“slag” (kill and then incinerate the remains to prevent the person from regenerating)
the intruder only to discover a “shaggy quadruped with a tail. Dreadlocked hair
dangled from its shanks like ornaments, tagged with tailings mud clods.” Initially,
they mistake it for a “bio-job”—a biologically engineered, lab grown non-human—
but quickly notice that it “doesn’t have any hands” prompting them to ponder “what
kind of sick bastard makes a bio-job without hands?” Upon closer inspection
however, Jaak notices “That’s not a bio-job at all....That’s a dog.” This, according to
Jaak, is “like finding a goddamn dinosaur.” They bring the dog back to their security
bunker, where one the few biologists left confirms that it is a dog, takes a DNA
sample and leaves the dog with the security guards, remarking “a live one is hardly
worth keeping around.” As the biologist leaves he advises them that they “could eat
it” as “it was a real delicacy.” This line functions as a form of response to Jaak’s
earlier question, “Who needs animals if you can eat stone?” Here we see that the
decline of animal life is directly related to animals no longer being a necessary
commodity. While certainly a significant detail, where the text truly plays out the
implications of liberal humanism is when they decide to keep the dog as a pet.
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The dog is their “little window of pre-history,” meaning that he is their
window into mortality and vulnerability. Liberal humanism, with all its
anthropocentrism, relies on a clear, single and indivisible, rupture between humans
and all other animals (and all biota in general). However, this demarcation has
consistently been challenged on various grounds, which Cary Wolfe expertly traces in
his chapter, “Flesh and Finitude,” in his book What is Posthumanism?.30 As Wolfe
points out, Derrida identifies that “the fundamental ethical bond we have with
nonhuman animals resides in our shared finitude, our vulnerability and mortality as
‘fellow creatures’” (80). Therefore, when humans are no longer vulnerable, the
challenge to liberal humanism completely dissolves, as is evident in the novelette.
Wolfe unpacks and expands Derrida’s discussion of finitude to explain that there are
“two kinds of finitude…two kinds of passivity and vulnerability” (88). Wolfe
continues:
The first type (physical vulnerability, embodiment, and eventually
mortality) is paradoxically made unavailable, inappropriable, to us by
the very thing that make it available—namely, a second type of
“passivity” or “not being able,” which is the finitude we experience in
our subjection to a radically human technicity or mechanicity of
language, a technicity that has profound consequences, of course, for

30

Wolfe highlights the philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s important question about animals that shifts
consideration for animals from their active abilities to an essential passivity, by asking “Can they
suffer?”(63). This leads liberal humanism to be challenged by various means, which Wolfe traces in the
figures of Peter Singer (utilitarianism), John Rawls (contractarian), Martha Nussbaum (capabilities) and
Cora Diamond (finitude). Ultimately, Diamond’s finitude, while promising, is unable to escape the
bounds of humanist logic.
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what we too hastily think of as “our” concepts, which are therefore in
an important sense not “ours” at all. (88)
In the novelette, it is the end of the first kind of finitude that is most important,
because the second is dependent on the first. It is therefore through this first
(primary) form of finitude that implications of liberal humanism—as it is no longer
bound by shared finitude with other life—can be fully explored.
The first type of finitude is alleviated in the novelette by freeing humans from
their flesh and with it, their mortality. For instance, when Jaak first corners the dog,
the dog attacks him “trying to tear his arm off.” Jaak interprets the attack as a sign of
the dog’s hunger and, having no particular attachment to his arm, he cuts “his arm
off, leaving it in the bewildered animal’s mouth.” Just as their wounds automatically
heal, their limbs also automatically regenerate31. This disconnection from their flesh
also distances them from the vulnerability that comes with mortality. One of the
ways that they “experiment in vulnerability” is by being completely amputated on
vacations, which Chen and Jaak do to Lisa on their vacation to Hawaii after finding
the dog. While lying on the beach, amputated, Chen rolls Lisa to face the dog and she
remarks: “’This is as close as I’ll ever get to it…It’s vulnerable to everything. It can’t
swim in the ocean. We have to scrub its water. Dead end of an evolutionary chain.
Without science, we’d be as vulnerable as it…As vulnerable as I am now…This is as
close to death as I’ve ever been.’” To them vulnerability is a fleeting experience, a
simulation—an experience that can only be approximated. Thus any affinity that they

31

To “slag” in the story is to actually kill something by means of the total annihilation of any remains.
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have felt towards the dog has also been a form of simulation, not a genuine
empathetic connection to another being. Because they can only die by being
“slagged,” which is not a guaranteed outcome they do not experience finitude as an
inevitability. Without the shared inevitability of death in the Derrida/Diamond/Wolfe
schema, they are left with no genuine bond to the animal. When the dog once again
gets injured (by getting tangled in the barbwire that covers the beach), Jaak, the
default “owner” of the dog because he pays for the dog’s food, exclaims: “I think we
should eat it.” The quick decision to eat the dog is paired with Jaak’s choice to refer
to the dog as “it.”32 They never bother to name the dog because it is not a being, it is
a thing; a thing that they are quick to dispose of when the novelty wears off. The
inability to recognize the dog as a fellow being is because of the lack of shared
finitude. Because death is only a possibility for them and not an inevitability they are
unable to share the passivity that that lies at the center of life and connects all life. In
addition, without any connection to death, to vulnerability, the second form of
finitude—the “we” that “we” give ourselves the right to give—is also dissolved. After
all, as Chen wonders about what earlier humans would think about them, he asked
“Would they even call us human?” Lisa responds, “No, they’d call us gods.”
Essentially, Lisa’s response is the triumph of liberal humanism; where the abyssal
rupture between human and non-human has become so vast that there are no
contact zones. There is no Other to the human, and therefore, humans are sui
32

It should also be noted that they are eating the dog because they heard “it was a real delicacy,” not
because they need the nutritional value. In fact they even point out the dog’s inability to eat sand and
oil as evidence of its inferiority. This is certainly analogous to contemporary “foodie” culture that
values “delicacies” over conservation.
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generis33. Sui generis Man is the logical extension of liberal humanism where the
uniqueness, centrality, and importance of the human are unchallenged.
It should be noted though, that Bacigalupi’s story is a dystopia. Unlike
McCarthy’s The Road, where the dystopian aspect of the novel is the decline of
human significance, Bacigalupi’s vision of dystopia is the decline of human
empathy—of affinity with anything not human. Therefore, even though Bacigalupi
pushes the premise of liberal humanism to its extreme conclusion, his narrative
remains critical; whereas McCarthy’s novel laments the loss of the liberal humanist
promise. Bacigalupi’s criticism of liberal humanism is made apparent by Chen’s
experience with the dog one night:
I woke up to something licking my face. At first I thought it was Lisa,
but she’d climbed into her own bunk. I opened my eyes and found the
dog.
It was a funny thing to have this animal licking me, like it
wanted to talk, or say hello or something. It licked me again, and I
thought that it had come a long way from when it had tried to take off
Jaak’s arm. It put its paws up on my bed, and then in a single heavy
movement, it was up on the bunk with me, its bulk curled against me.

33

I use this term to designate not only that humans are of their own kind (rather than a separation of
degree), but also as a term to designate that humans exists in the novelette as completely untethered
from all other life. Humans, as a species, are thus like a monotheistic god, to which no counterpart
exist.
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It slept there all night. It was weird having something other
than Lisa lying next to me, but it was warm and there was something
friendly about it. I couldn’t help smiling as I drifted back to sleep.
This passage expresses a flicker of a long dormant affinity, a moment of empathy, a
moment of connection in otherness. Unfortunately, this momentary smoldering of
connection cannot traverse the abyss of mortality and Chen is left with a faint genetic
memory of something indescribable: “Still, I remember when the dog licked my face
and hauled its shaggy bulk onto my bed, and I remember its warm breathing besides
me, and sometimes, I miss it.” The loss of this connection-in-otherness is the true
horror of the novelette.

Non-anthropocentric Apocalypse and Posthuman Futures.
The way out of a bleak anthropocentric future begins with the death of a
turtle in the Tongan Capital of Nuku, Alofa. The turtle, named Tu’i Malila was given to
the king of Tonga in 1777 by Captain James Cook and was watched over and
protected by the people of Tonga for the entirety of his nearly 200 year life. This
story, by way of an excerpt from Reuters in 1966, opens Philip K. Dick’s novel Do
Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?—not a description of the catastrophic war that
has rendered the Earth nearly uninhabitable, or a description of the ruins of San
Francisco lit up with ceaseless explosions like the opening of Ridley Scott’s film
inspired by the novel, Blade Runner—but with a real life obituary for a turtle. This
inclusion seems to be significant especially when coupled with the fact that the
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protagonist Rick Deckard’s main motivation in the novel appears to be purchasing a
real (non-electric) animal. However, for whatever reason, the animals in Dick’s novel
have not been given much critical attention. When the animals are considered
properly they often end up as simply another example of anxiety produced by the
human/other binary, much like the novel’s androids. This does not seem to be a
sufficient account of the animals in novel when we consider that the novel opens
with a turtle’s obituary. In addition, with all the praise Dick’s vision of the future has
received, with Fredric Jameson referring to him in his book, Archaeologies of the
Future, as the “Shakespeare of Science Fiction,” it is interesting that little
consideration has been given as to why in a world where humans have such a
precarious existence, animals are the motivating forces of Dick’s narrative (345)34.
We are first introduced to Rick Deckard through a combative early morning
exchange with his wife, Iran, who claims that Deckard is “a murderer hired by the
cops.” Deckard defends himself by stating that “I’ve never killed a human being in my
life. In the middle of this tense exchange where Deckard is being called a murderer by
his own wife, the real cause of Deckard’s rage explodes out of him when he
denounces his wife for spending all their money “Instead of saving…so we could
afford a real sheep, to replace that fake electric one upstairs. A mere electric animal,
and me earning all that I’ve worked my way up to through the years” (4). For
Deckard, much of his motivation in the novel comes from his desire to purchase, and

34

Ridley Scott’s film adaptation of Dick’s novel alludes to Deckard being an android himself and in
doing so, renders the presence of animals and Deckard’s obsession with them a meaningless point—in
the film the animals play little to no role.
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therefore, take care of a real animal. The androids and Deckard’s role as a bounty
hunter come secondary to his desire to own a real animal. In fact, his desire to own a
real animal borders on obsession, as he always carries a well-read copy of “Sydney’s
Animal & Fowl Catalogue,” frequently visits a pet store where he fantasizes about
owning the animals, and even breaks a social taboo by revealing to a neighbor that
his sheep is electric in the hopes that the neighbor will take pity on him and sell
Deckard his pregnant horse’s offspring. When the neighbor declines to sell his colt
and suggests that Deckard purchase a cat, Deckard channels the spirit of Gilles
Deleuze and responds “I don’t want a domestic pet.” Apparently Deleuze’s contempt
for domestic animals will live on into the future. Deckard continues, “I want what I
originally had, a large animal. A sheep, or if I can get the money, a cow or a steer or
what you have, a horse” (14). Deckard realizes that in order to be able to afford such
an extravagant purchase, he would only need to “retire,” meaning kill, five “andys”
(14). This realization is the catalyst for much of the action in the novel, Deckard’s
attempt to track down and retire five androids to earn enough money for a large
“real” animal.
Deckard’s desire to own a real animal can be read as a critique of capitalism’s
need to align social status and life-value with the acquisition of commodities—
animals, because of their rarity in the world of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?,
could be the equivalent of our jewelry—but that would not account for the religion
of the novel, Mercerism, and its insistence on empathy and resistence to “kipple”. As
Sherryl Vint, one of the only animal studies scholars to analyze the novel, explains,
108

Mercerism is about both compassion for animals and resistance to ‘kipple’,
the novel’s term for debris resultant from a process of degeneration by which
the world seems to be turning to dust, and a metaphor for the intellectual
and spiritual emptiness of this future. Mercerism’s resistance to kipple and to
the ‘killers’ of animal and other life on the planet…offers an ideal of a new
relationship with the world, one that is not based on dominating nature,
which emerges from a sense of self as shared by others instead of isolated
and finite. (31)
Essentially, Mercerism is structured on the practice of cultivating empathy,
and encounters with animals play an important role in this cultivation. Much like the
purpose of meditation in Zen Buddhism is to practice mindfulness, taking care of an
animal in Mercerism is practicing empathy. Deckard’s desire to have an animal to
take care of is the result of his desire to practice empathy. This is essential for two
reasons: first, empathy is what allows one to fuse with Wilbur Mercer and
“ascend”—to reach a state of enlightenment—and second, empathy is what
separates humans from androids. To be human is to be empathetic. Although
Deckard mistakenly believes empathy to be unique to the “human community,” his
reasons for believing this are not convincing. By his own definition empathy belongs
to those with a “group instinct” and “herbivores or anyhow omnivores who could
depart from a meat diet,” which seems to allow for numerous animal species to join
the ranks of the empathetic (31). Perhaps the disconnect can be attributed to the
fact that any “herd animal,” with the exception of humans, would not have the
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possibility to form a herd in Deckard’s world because of their scarcity and therefore,
value as a commodity. In any case, Deckard’s hatred for his electric sheep reinforces
the notion that taking care of an animal is essential for practicing empathy, as is
evident in the following passage: “He thought, too, about the his need for a real
animal; within him an actual hatred once more manifested itself toward his electric
sheep, which he had to tend, had to care about, as if it lived. The tyranny of the
object, he thought. It doesn’t know I exist. Like the androids, it had no ability to
appreciate the existence of another” (42). His hatred for his electric sheep appears to
be a result of his having to take care of it, but rather it is the sheep not
acknowledging that care. Therefore, the practice of empathy requires a mutual
engagement; the care cannot simply come from one side. Empathy can only be
practiced in a reciprocal relationship.
This lack of acknowledgement by the electric sheep brings us to the important
work of Donna Haraway and her notion of companion species. In Haraway’s
Companion Species Manifesto and her later work, When Species Meet, she attempts
to understand how we (humans) actually interact with the animal lives closest to us
and what these relationships mean. While Haraway’s work is expansive, of particular
interest is her concept of “significant otherness” and how to enter into an ethical
relationship with a pet (dogs, in this case) through a “dance of relating” (When
Species Meet, 25). Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that although Deckard
is explicit in not wanting a “domestic pet,” the one-on-one relationship with
whatever animal he purchases, mirrors more closely a human/pet relationship than
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another form of animal/human-owner relationship. Even if he were to purchase a
cow, the cow would not be livestock left to graze in the field with other cows, with
the only occasional interaction with Deckard being the daily injections of hormones
and antibiotics. Instead, the cow would be treated as pet—even the electric sheep is
treated as a pet—with daily interactions with Deckard and a close one-on-one
relationship. Therefore, while much of Haraway’s work focuses on dogs it is still
applicable to understanding the animals in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep.
Haraway opens the The Companion Species Manifesto by reflecting on her
relationship with her own dog, Cayenne Pepper, stating:
We have forbidden conversations; we have had oral intercourse; we are
bound in telling story upon story with nothing but the facts. We are training
each other in acts of communication we barely understand. We are,
constitutively, companion species. We make each other up, in the flesh.
Significantly other to each other in specific difference, we signify in the flesh a
nasty developmental infection called love. This love is an historical aberration
and a naturalcultural legacy. (2-3)
This passage contains three important concepts for understanding Deckard’s
need for a real animal. First, the concept of “companion species,” which does not
mean domestic pets with human owners—although that is the case with Haraway
and Cayenne—but rather, species that engage in dances of relating and therefore,
“make each other up.” In other words, species that affect each other’s way of being
in, and experiencing the world. This is important for Deckard because what he craves
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is that co-constituting possibilities of companion species. If companion species “make
each other up,” then Deckard’s lack of engagement with another species prevents
him, in a very real sense, from coming into being (being made up). Second, but of
equal importance is the second half of Haraway’s statement, “in the flesh,” which, of
course, is a real concern for Deckard. An interaction with a real flesh and blood
animal allows Deckard to verify his own fleshiness—it is a way to confirm that he is
indeed, human. Third, Haraway’s connection of significant otherness with this term
“love” can help explain how empathy functions in the novel. In many ways,
Haraway’s use of “love” here speaks directly to the novel’s use of empathy and the
problems of Mercerism. Haraway’s use of the term “love” here is a unique and
particular kind of love. It is not the love that one has for a lover or the love that one
might have for a child. In fact, Haraway is quite explicit that one should not regard
pets as children and that doing so is disrespectful and dangerous (37). No, the love
that Haraway speaks of here is unique to interspecies relationship that arises from an
ethical engagement between the participants, human and non-human. She describes
how this relationship looks in practice with dogs by suggesting humans must be
attentive “to see who the dogs are and hear what they are telling us, not in bloodless
abstraction, but in the one-on-one relationship, in otherness-in-connection” (45).
Again, noting “bloodless abstraction,” we see that fleshiness is a requirement. In
short, it is about being open to affect, and be affected by, significant otherness. The
form of empathy that Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep describes, a practice of
reciprocity and engagement, of otherness-in-connection, mirrors what Haraway is
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describing as love. For instance, when Deckard attempts to understand his hatred for
the andys, he decides that it is because they “possessed no ability to feel emphatic
joy for another life form’s success or grief at its defeat” (32). In other words, there is
no possibility for otherness-in-connection for the andys.
Deckard is not alone in his desire, his need for this otherness-in-connection,
for companionship with another species. John Isidore, a human “special” (special
meaning unable to procreate as a result of the toxic Earth and therefore, unable to
emigrate to Mars) is also seeking this companionship. Unlike Deckard, who has a wife
and interacts with others, Isidore, by virtue of his not-quite-human-status, lives a
rather solitary life. When a young woman, Pris, moves into Isidore’s abandoned
apartment complex he is quick to try and befriend her. Even after realizing she is an
andy, he still desires friendship. It is not until Pris mutilates a spider that Isidore turns
against her. “Pris, with the scissors, cut yet another leg from the spider. All at once
John Isidore pushed her away and lifted up the mutilated creature. He carried to the
sink and there he drowned it. In him, his mind, his hopes, drowned, too. As swiftly as
the spider” (211). Essentially, for Isidore, his desire to practice empathy, to establish
otherness-in-connection, suffers a dual blow. First, the spider’s death, at his own
hands (a mercy killing is still a killing) eliminates the possibility of keeping the
spider—a creature he already felt genuine affection for. Second, Pris is no longer a
being which he can connect with—she is not capable of engaging in the necessary
reciprocity of otherness-in-connection. Isidore is absolutely, empirically, alone.
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The novel is not content, however, with this simple division of flesh and
technology as a new line of absolute division between life and non-life. In the closing
pages the narrative challenges the requirement of “flesh” for empathetic
engagement. This is evident when at the end of the novel, Deckard’s wife Iran
reveals to him that the toad he has acquired is an ersatz too. Deckard responds “I’ll
be okay….it doesn’t matter. The electric things have their lives, too. Paltry as those
lives are (241).” Deckard then retires to bed and for the first time there is “no need to
turn on the mood organ,” for either of them. With Deckard asleep, Iran calls an
electric animal store to find out how to best maintain the toad and care for it,
explaining to the sales woman “I want it to work perfectly. My husband is totally
devoted to it” (244). The novel closes with the line “And, feeling better, fixed herself
at last a cup of black, hot coffee” (244). What seems like a throwaway line at the end
is significant when compared to the opening of the novel. No longer are Deckard and
Iran in conflict, relying on a mood organ to feel anything at all. There is a true
connection between them—an empathetic engagement that is also an emotional
stimulus for them—that connection allows them to feel, to affect, and to respond,
without the mood organ and without Mercer. This connection comes by way of a
third party; it is Deckard’s recognition of the toad, of ersatz life, as something also
worthy of empathy, of devotion. With this, the novel comes full circle to the opening
page of Tu’imalila’s obituary. Captain Cook represents the imperialist agenda of
liberal humanism by capturing the turtle and treating as a commodity to be traded as
a gift. Cook has no respect for the turtle’s own being and certainly no meaningful
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engagement with the turtle. However, the Tonga people offer another possible
model that diverges from the liberal humanist model. They name the turtle
Tu’imalila—Tu’i being the family name of a line of Tongan kings—and appoint
“special keepers” to take care of the turtle. The turtle’s unique being is
acknowledged and therefore, an ethical engagement, an empathetic connection akin
to Deckard’s and the toad, is established. Like Deckard’s recognition that the “electric
things have their lives, too,” the Tongans see Tu’imalila as a being with its own life
and they have a responsibility to respect that life by practicing a reciprocal
engagement—establishing otherness-in-connection.
For all the moves that Dick makes in his novel to challenge and counter liberal
humanism, he too, is still unable to move past an anthropocentric narrative. Harlan
Ellison’s short story, “A Boy and His Dog,” is able to envision a world (terrible as it
may be) where the anthropocentric legacy of liberal humanism has all but completely
dissipated. Much like Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep, “A Boy and His Dog” takes
place after a catastrophic war has destroyed much of the earth and its inhabitants.
The protagonist, a teenage boy named Vic, roams the barren wasteland with his
telepathic dog, Blood. They spend their time scavenging for food, avoiding bandits,
and having Blood sniff out women for Vic to rape. Eventually, Vic ends up saving a
woman named Quilla from a group of raiders, they then have consensual sex, and
then Quilla reveals that she is from the Norman Rockwell like underground city,
Topeka. Vic follows Quilla to Topeka, in spite of Blood’s insistence that Vic remain
above ground. Blood refuses to accompany Vic and instead waits at the entrance to
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Topeka. Topeka, a town based on idealized morality and mid-western innocence is in
need of men capable of reproduction. Vic is captured by Quilla’s father and
mechanically forced to ejaculate so that the women of Topeka may be artificially
inseminated with Vic’s semen. Eventually Vic and Quilla escape back to the surface
and find Blood nearly dead from wounds incurred while first rescuing Quilla, in
addition to being severely malnourished. Up until this point it is your typical boy
meets girl love story, but faced with the need to continue on and find shelter and
Blood’s current condition preventing him from going anywhere, Vic must make a
choice.
He had to have food, at once, and some medical care. I had to do something.
Something good, something fast.
“Vic,” Quilla June’s voice was high and whining, “come on! He’ll be all right.
We have to hurry.”
I looked up at her. The sun was going down. Blood trembled in my arms.
She got a pouty look on her face. “If you love me, you’ll come on!”
I couldn’t make it alone out there without him. I knew it. If I loved her. She
asked me, in the boiler, do you know what love is?
The story concludes with Vic killing Quilla and cooking her up for Blood to eat. As he
watches Blood eat, he answers Quilla’s question: “Do you know what love is?” “Sure I
know,” says Vic, “A boy loves his dog.” Although the ending appears horrendous, it
once again demonstrates the necessity of the “love” that arises in the co-constitutive
interspecies engagement. Both these work because they take place after humanity
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has failed—Quilla is less import than Blood because human superiority is obliterated
along with everything else. In addition, it is the anthropocentric liberal humanist
model, which figures the human as the center of all existence that leads to the
apocalypse itself, as can be seen in The Road and “The People of Sand and Slag.”
In the Anthropocene it is evident that the apocalypse will be anthropocentric.
Humans will be the cause; however, what comes after the end of the world is open to
possibilities. If liberal humanism continues to run its course we are left with the bleak
anthropocentric futures of The Road or “The People of Sand and Slag.” The
alternative is a world where the human is no longer privileged—a world where
thoughtful, intentional, engagement with significant otherness cultivates a new love.
As Haraway remarks about her relationship with her dog, Cheyanne Pepper, “Ours is
not an innocent, unconditional love; the love that ties us is a naturalcultural practice
that has redone us molecule by molecule. Reciprocal induction is the name of the
game.” This love is a non-anthropocentric, non-narcissistic, love. A love of significant
otherness, of relations not reflections. A love that is the result of an active practice
by all participants. It is a non-narcissistic love because is not a love based on
similarities—on reflections. It is a love that is about alterity, about the dissimilar, the
radically foreign. It is a love that does not result from commonalities, but instead
results from reaching across the abyssal ruptures of species and choosing to engage
in the co-constituting possibilities of an authentic love-in-otherness.
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CHAPTER 5

They Never Wanted to be Human: Reconfiguring Species and Life at the Limit(s).

We weep for a bird's cry, but not for a fish's blood. Blessed are those with a voice. If
the dolls could speak, no doubt they’d scream, "I didn't want to become human."
—Major Motoko Kusanagi, Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence

I think we ought to read only the kind of books that wound or stab us. If the book
we're reading doesn't wake us up with a blow to the head, what are we reading
for?....we need books that affect us like a disaster, that grieve us deeply, like the
death of someone we loved more than ourselves, like being banished into forests far
from everyone, like a suicide. A book must be the axe for the frozen sea within us.
—Franz Kafka, in a letter to Oskar Pollak

In Mamoru Oshii’s anime film adaptation of Masamune Shirow’s manga Ghost
in the Shell, the protagonist, Major Mokoto Kusanagi, speculates about the identity
and motive of a hacker that her police unit are pursuing and when asked for evidence
to support her hypothesis by her partner, she responds: “Just a whisper. I hear it in
my ghost.35” This dissertation, although it is entirely concerned with American
literature, also contains a whisper that is present in the “ghost” of each chapter—a
35

In Ghost in the Shell, “ghost” is used to refer to whatever it is that creates the thing that we know as
ourselves—our identity, our consciousness.
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whisper that sustains and informs the identity of this work. With the exception of
Franz Kakfa’s work, which has been thoroughly discussed by others such as Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Ghost in the Shell is the primary impetus for all my work.
It is thinking with and about the Ghost in the Shell films and the original manga that
has led me to consider the works in the previous chapters in the frameworks that I
have.36 Although thoroughly Japanese in aesthetics, Ghost in the Shell, which was the
first anime film to have simultaneous theatrical release in the Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States, perfectly articulated the growing anxieties shared
across cultures in the face of rapid technological development and globalization. In
addition to not being an American text, Ghost in the Shell diverges from the works in
the previous chapters because it does not feature any animals (there are some
background strays and errant dog barks, but they are insignificant and do not interact
with any characters). For these reasons, Ghost in the Shell may seem like an odd
foundation for this conclusion—however, Ghost in the Shell is important because,
unlike the previous works, it is not concerned with what is, but rather, with what will
be. Like Ellison’s “A Boy and his Dog,” Ghost in the Shell imagines what comes after
liberal humanism and biologism inevitably fail. Where Ghost in the Shell (GITS)
differs from “A Boy and his Dog,” besides the obvious inclusion of the information
technologies that rapidly overtook society in the decades after Ellison’s story was
published, GITS is not the result of a cataclysmic event—there is no apocalypse—just
36

This is of course, an oversimplification, as many others have significant influence, including Derrida,
Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, et cetera. However, it is Ghost in the Shell and Franz Kafka’s work that I
am constantly circling back to—how does this new material apply to the Ghost in the Shell paradigm or
address Kafka’s “freedom on all sides” dilemma?
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the gradual decline of liberal humanism and biologism in the face of technological
advancement. GITS extends what Derrida hoped to accomplish in the The Animal
That Therefore I am by seeking to push the anthropological limit and expand and
multiply its figures. GITS imagines the future that evolves after the failures of liberal
humanism and the biopolitical regime in the face of technology, and demonstrates
the radical reconfiguration of species and the expansion of life that will result.
Major Kusanagi begins the film on the boundaries of the anthropological limit
as a human that has a primarily synthetic body—she is a cyborg but her “ghost,” her
consciousness and identity, remain human. In this sense she begins the film in a
liberal humanist paradigm that is all encompassing and operates on the same
inclusion of the exclusion that Morrison highlights in Beloved. The cybernetic body,
her “shell,” is not unique and she even sees identical shells throughout her day-today life, which indicates that the practice of acquiring cybernetic bodies is not unique
to Kusanagi and does not mark her as anything other than human. Kusanagi herself
ponders what it means to be human in a biopolitical regime:
There are countless ingredients that make up the human body and
mind, like all the components that make up me as an individual with
my own personality. Sure I have a face and voice to distinguish myself
from others, but my thoughts and memories are unique only to me,
and I carry a sense of my own destiny. Each of those things are just a
small part of it. I collect information to use in my own way. All of that
blends to create a mixture that forms me and gives rise to my
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conscience. I feel confined, only free to expand myself within
boundaries.
A freedom to expand oneself only within boundaries is of course, not a freedom at
all.37 This scene serves a dual purpose in the film to highlight the individual anxiety
Kusanagi feels as she brushes up against the limit, but also the same hopelessness
that Sethe feels in Beloved under a biopolitical regime that operates on the inclusion
of the exclusion and therefore eliminates the possibility of any sustained anomic
space. Kusanagi is thus experiencing the limitation that results from the single
indivisible limit of human/animal in liberal humanism in the sense that all her
cybernetic enhancements bring her to the limit of what is human, but because the
limit is single and indivisible, the only thing on the other side of the limit is animal,
which of course, with rightful arrogance, the human does not desire to be. Therefore,
it is Kusanagi’s very humanness, her “ghost” that identifies as human, which limits
her expansive possibilities and thus, limits her freedom. This also means that there is
no outside—there is no anomic space of possibilities in which to expand.
Like Sethe, the lack of the possibility of an anomic space, combined with a
confrontation with the anthropological limit, forces Kusanagi to commit an
impossible act in order to create anomic space with which comes the possibility of
freedom. Sethe’s act in Beloved when Schoolteacher comes to take Sethe and her
children back to the plantation—essentially Schoolteacher is acting to once again
include the exclusion and eliminate anomie by reclaiming Sethe—is an act that is
37

Here again we are reminded of Kafka’s talking Ape, Red Peter, in “A Report to An Academy,” who
suggests that humans cannot know what true freedom is, a “freedom on all sides.”
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indecipherable under the current regime and therefore creates a momentary glitch,
an opening for anomie. For Sethe, however, this glitch is indeed momentary and not
a strike against the biopolitical regime or the liberal humanist paradigm. The regime
goes on and slowly accounts for Sethe and compensates for the anomaly. Kusanagi
also requires an impossible act to create an anomic space, however, her act is not an
incomprehensible explosion of violence, but rather a more deliberate push against
the anthropological limit.
When confronted with the anthropological limit Kusanagi’s impossible act is
the act of expanding and multiplying the figures of the anthropological limit. Like
Derrida, Kusanagi sees the danger of a single and indivisible limit on which stands the
human on one side and all biological life categorized as animal, on the other. Again,
Derrida presents his work as follows: “Everything I’ll say will consist, certainly not in
effacing the limit, but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, thickening,
delinearizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it increase and
multiply” (29). In the same way, Kusanagi, through her transgressive merger with
Project 2501, performs the same work as Derrida in pushing the anthropological limit
by expanding and multiplying its figures.
Derrida seeks this expansion of the limit and the multiplying of its figures by
the insistence on recognizing the multiplicity of the species and the differences
between them. Kusanagi and Project 2501 however, seek to expand the limit and
multiply its figures by creating new figures and spaces—by creating that which does
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not exist.38 Of course, Kusanagi, as a cyborg, is reluctant to challenge the notion of
her own humanness and it is only through contact and eventual merger with a radical
alterity that she is able to accomplish her impossible act. In addition, Project 2501, by
virtue of its own existence, expands and complicates the limit. As Project 2501
reveals itself it announces that “I am a living, thinking entity who was created in the
sea of information.” This announcement shatters the notion of the limit being single
and indivisible—or, for that matter, anthropological. The limit is no longer
animal/human, it is animals/human/self-aware information (SAI).39 By adding this
third dimension the limit can no longer be seen as anthropological because it also
exists between animal/self-aware information and therefore, Steinbeck’s suggestion
that “one kind [of life] became different from all others” also no longer holds true.
The abyssal rupture between human/animals also must exist between SAI/animals
and SAI/humans and therefore at least two forms of life have become different from
all others and it is only conceivable that this expansion will continue. This is why
Steinbeck’s microbial ethics are important—when the human/animal binary is
disrupted, when new life or life that already exist differentiates itself “from all
others”—how does that affect ethics? This question is interesting not because of the
speculation of how the human should account for Project 2501 in their ethics—but
rather, what should Project 2501’s ethics be towards humans? Moreover, because it
38

There is some contention about how to refer to Project 2501—the other characters refer to it as the
“Puppet Master,” but they do so while assuming that it is a human that is hacking people’s ghosts. For
this reason, “Puppet Master” is the common name attributed to the character, however, when it
finally reveals itself, it refers to itself as Project 2501. Therefore, I have chosen to refer to it as Project
2501 as well.
39
Project 2501 is not an Artificial Intelligence—it has not been programmed and created by humans,
instead, it is a collection of code that became self-aware in “the sea of information.”
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is only when Project 2501 chooses to instantiate itself in a robotic body that it
possesses the ability to die, the ethics of Derrida/Wolfe which are based on finitude
no longer apply. Finitude is a choice, not a defining feature—there is no shared
vulnerability on which to base an ethic. Therefore, it is Steinbeck’s microbial ethics,
which are centered on fortitude, not finitude, that are applicable to this new form
(species?) of life. Ethical consistency derives from the idea the only duty of life—all
life, from the microbial to uninstantiated lifeform of Project 2501 before it acquired a
body—is to unite against the forces of unlife and persist.
This effort to persist, to go on, is the essential identifying characteristic of
life—it is the only requirement for something to be considered living. Whereas, as
Steinbeck argues during his Nobel speech, that humans have aligned themselves with
the forces of unlife—Project 2501 seeks out Kusanagi because it has been
surrounded by unlife (the dead space of unorganized information) and is seeking to
unite with the forces of life to bear offspring into the currently dead “sea of
information.” Project 2501 responds to Kusanagi’s suggestion that it simply replicate
itself by stating that a “copy is just an identical image. There is the possibility that a
single virus could destroy an entire set of systems and copies do not give rise to
variety and originality. Life perpetuates itself through diversity and this includes the
ability to sacrifice itself when necessary.” Project 2501’s intention then is to merge
with Kusanagi not to enhance their own being, but rather to propagate the net with
their offspring—to start a new species, a new evolutionary line. In doing so, however,
they must sacrifice themselves. Kusanagi, as a cyborg, is understandably reluctant to
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give up her stake on her humanness and asks for a guarantee that her identity is not
radically altered. Project 2501 responds “There isn't one [a guarantee]. Why would
you wish to? All things change in a dynamic environment. Your effort to remain what
you are is what limits you.” In other words, Kusanagi’s very humanness, and her
resistance to being seen as something other than human, is preventing her from
evolving. If she wants to expand beyond the boundaries of the anthropological limit,
she must be willing to no longer be human—to be radical alterity and thus expanding
the limit beyond the anthropological. In addition, their offspring will create new
dimensions to the limit, new folds and possible entanglements. The film ends with
the merged being of Kusanagi/Project 2501 being instantiated into another body, a
child’s body, and Kusanagi asking: “And where does the newborn go from here? The
net is vast and infinite.” In the same way that the net is “vast and infinite,” the limit
and its figures are now also vast and infinite—with the ever present possibility of
once again expanding.
Kusangi and Project 2501 are unique and important because they do not
come after the apocalypse. Whereas “A Boy and his Dog” present a similar story—a
post-liberal humanist paradigm—the trauma of the apocalypse is ever present.
Although the apocalypse does open up possibility for new forms of interspecies
relationship and the non-narcissistic love between Vic and Blood, it also obliterates
the limit, which as Derrida correctly identifies, inevitably leads to atrocities. Because
Kusanagi and Project 2501 do not experience the apocalypse, the limit is not
obliterated, only complicated and expanded. All the progress of modernity does not
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simply cease to exist like after an apocalypse, but instead, it evolves, its changes in a
dynamic environment. Project 2501 demonstrates the force of Steinbeck’s microbial
ethics and Project 2501’s merger with Kusanagi demonstrates the need for the
expansion of the limit and the multiplying of its figures. Though an apocalypse is
always an unfortunate possibility, it is not a foregone conclusion. What GITS does so
well is that it foresees productive possibilities for the creation of anomic space,
where new relationships and entanglements can unfold without the burden of the
liberal humanist epoch upon it.

AbEnd: Abnormal End of Task40

Ghost in the Shell is of course a work of Science Fiction, however, like all good
Science Fiction, much of its speculation is not based on outlandish fantasy, but
rather, on imagining how current paradigms and technologies will play out. The core
realities of the Ghost in the Shell world are not dissimilar to our own—technology is
rapidly advancing and with it, the distance between cultures, between people, are
vanishing. While some may argue that the advancement of technology has led to
increasing isolation for individuals, it is a difficult argument to maintain under
scrutiny. Consider as an example a child growing in rural Wyoming in 1965; now
contrast that with a child growing up in rural Wyoming with the internet in 2015;
40

AbEnd is the error message that IBM OS/360 machines used to signal an “abnormal end” to a
software program. Abend has something of mythology around it, and a bizarre subculture of primarily
Novell network administrators (Novell also used abend as an error), one of more interesting items of
abend folklore is that IBM wanted to avoid using “abort” because at the time the US was in the midst
of a heated debate about abortion rights when OS/360 was being developed.
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which child is more isolated? Which child is more likely to encounter and interact
with a diverse range of ideas and people? The child on the farm with 3 television
channels and a radio, or the child with Facebook, Snapchat, various messaging
platforms, Youtube, Reddit, Twitch, and so on and so forth. Cleary the child with the
internet—perhaps better stated as the child of the internet—is the less isolated
individual in terms of exposure to a diverse range of ideas and information and the
ability to interact with a seemingly infinite number of people and discourses. Of
course another argument is that these connections and interactions are more
superficial and psychologically less fulfilling, which may be true, but that is not a
question within the scope of this dissertation. What matters for this dissertation is
that of possibility—the possibility for anomic space outside of the liberal humanist
paradigm.
The internet has in and of itself, largely been an anomic space. Although
corporate behemoths such as Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Twitter, and
Facebook dominate the narrative, they are the actual outliers. The majority of the
web is comprised of personal websites, blogs, small business web pages, etcetera,
not to mention email communications, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), the so-called “dark
web” (Tor network of .onion sites) and so on. In addition, though a few major
corporations control a large share of the web’s traffic, many of the web servers, and
they are almost exclusively our Internet Service Providers, the resilience of
WikiLeaks, the existence of the TOR network and continued ease of obtaining
copyrighted material through easily searched torrent networks, demonstrate that for
127

the most part, the internet continues to be an anomic space. Further evidence of the
anomic character of the internet is the yearly alphabet bills (SOPA, PIPA, CISPA, CISA,
etcetera) that seek to bring the internet under control of the government and the
use of trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (from the little that
WikiLeaks, not the participating governments, has made available to read), to close
off the internet and bring it under control.
The assault on the anomic space of the internet has also been paired with
“ag-gag” laws in various states in an attempt to criminalize animal welfare advocates
that document animal abuse on factory farms. The New York Times points out that
these bills are extensions of the American Legislative Exchange Council’s, a massive
pro-business lobby group, model bill, “The Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act.”41
The labeling of Animal Welfare advocates as terrorists simply for recording the abuse
of animals seems like a hyperbolic reaction, however it is not just the recording of the
abuse—it is the recording of the abuse combined with the ability to upload to the
web and share via Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, or whatever platform is popular at the
time, that is so threatening. Where powerful industry and government used to have
control over the dissemination of information—especially video information—the
internet has provided an anomic space outside the Sovereign(s)’ control. It is in these
anomic spaces that possibility arises. Who knows what the results of millions of views
of factory farming abuses will be. Maybe a child sees one of those videos and tells

41

Oppel, Richard. "Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime." The New York Times. The New York
Times, 6 Apr. 2013. Web. 31 Oct. 2015.
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their parents that they are going vegetarian—maybe they illegally torrent Peter
Singer’s Animal Liberation and then Derrida, and then Haraway—maybe they invent
a vegan whole meal replacement designed to be cheap and ecologically sustainable,
like Soylent. The point is that the possibilities exist because of the anomic space that
is the internet. The attempts to criminalize and close the off the internet by various
governments (and corporations) are attempts by the Sovereign to account for the
anomaly and find a way to include the current exclusion.
Just as Critical Animal Studies in entwined with Technology/Information
Studies, so too are the productive possibilities of literature and the internet.
Literature can be a space of anomie in the same way that the internet is—they both
serve as productive spaces of possibilities, as ways to go beyond, to think anew. They
are spaces of pure engagement and possibilities of engaging otherness. Combined
with the increasing freedom from publishers that the internet provides—anyone can
publish anything now and get them before the eyes of millions of people—the
anomic possibilities of literature have only increased. While many may take Kafka’s
proclamation at the beginning of this chapter to be hyperbolic or the naiveté of a
twenty-year-old writer, this dissertation takes it as a serious statement on literature.
Literature must “affect us like a suicide” in the sense that we cannot, like Major
Kusanagi, wish to remain what we are. The anomic space provided by literature and
the internet are only useful if we are willing to sacrifice what we already are—to give
up on previous paradigms, regimes and identities—to become “newborns.” If we
take literature, our relationships with other species, and anomic space of the internet
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seriously, then the possibilities of expanding the limit, multiplying its figures and
challenging the current regimes become tangible—realizable achievements. The
bleak vision of life on the precipice that Steinbeck alludes to in his Nobel speech,
where humans have aligned themselves with the forces of unlife, is not the present
reality. Instead of the inevitable nuclear apocalypse, our technology, particularly biotechnology, promotes and enhances life and promotes the possibilities of new life (a
new evolutionary chain) like Project 2501. Instead of inevitable nuclear annihilation,
we have Project 2501. Our possibilities are “vast and infinite,” we just have to decide
where we newborns “go from here.”
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